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I. Introduction 
 
 
Current trends in the enlargement process of the European Union (EU) offer a virtual laboratory 
through which to gain insight into the mechanics of constitutional change.  In particular, the 
Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, including Romania and Serbia, serve as great 
lenses through which to view the processes involved in consolidating democracy through 
constitutional dynamics.  Even though EU accession may offer a set of incentives to these and 
other recent candidate countries, primarily in the form of economic benefits, political clout, and 
hope for stability, pro-democracy constitutional change aimed at meeting EU standards still 
requires a push from domestic coalitions within national political systems.  Incentive structures 
that emerge from external sources, such as the EU, are not quick, automatic ways to enact 
democracy.  Indeed, utilizing the rule of law toward sustainable democratic consolidation 
requires at least a minimum amount of support from within a country – such is the nature of 
democracy. 
 In this thesis, I will address, at the broadest level, the implications of constitutional 
change for democracy by exploring processes of constitutional change undertaken by nations 
applying for EU membership.  While the EU mandates that applicant nations comply with its 
political and economic standards for entrance, known as the Copenhagen Criteria, the actual 
push for necessary constitutional change in these countries has—and must—come from 
coalitions of actors within the applicant nations.  This distinction between analyzing policy 
change from the ‘top-down’ and the ‘bottom-up’ levels is crucial in appreciating the main 
contributions of this thesis.  In fact, a majority of the literature focusing on EU applicant 
countries has interpreted policy change in applicant countries from the ‘top-down’ perspective 
over the past half century by focusing on the ways in which the EU or other international actors 
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have influenced domestic policies in applicant countries.
1
  However, this thesis properly 
attributes agency to domestic actors and coalitions, which are indispensible in creating 
democratic constitutional change in any democratic society.  In this context, the empirical 
analysis in this thesis will address three primary questions: 
1. What types of domestic coalitions might actively pursue (or resist) constitutional 
change toward democracy? 
 
2. How do successful domestic actors politically frame the issue of constitutional change? 
 
3. What influence do differences in political opportunities and institutions have on 
constitutional change outcomes in the direction of the Copenhagen Criteria? 
 
Examining these main questions of constitutional change by comparing the cases of domestic 
coalitions in Romania and Serbia will offer great insight into the process of democratization for 
current and future EU applicants.  Furthermore, it provides an empirical take on the necessary 
combinations of factors that must be in place in order to bring about constitutional change more 
broadly. 
 
Case Selection: Different Paths to Constitutional Reform 
 
The cases of Romania and Serbia represent two very different stories of CEE countries enacting 
constitutional changes, only three years apart, both of which ultimately met with EU praise.  On 
the one hand, Romania’s 2003 constitutional reform came as the culmination of years of 
accession talks with the EU; indeed Romania’s constitutional changes in 2003 paved the way to 
its EU membership beginning in 2007.  Meanwhile, Serbia remains to this day only a prospective 
candidate for EU membership—not yet in the negotiating phase.  In this way, Serbia’s impetus 
for constitutional reforms came not from an immediate chance to join the EU, but rather from 
events that resulted in the country’s need to modernize.  In this way, Romania and Serbia 
                                                 
1
 Amichai Magen and Leonard Morlino (eds.), International Actors, Democratization and the Rule of 
Law: Anchoring democracy? (New York: Routledge, 2009), 26-27.  
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differed fundamentally on two related issues: how far along each country was in the EU-
negotiating process, and how much internal support Europeanization and Western democracy 
were receiving in each nation.  This analysis aims to establish why domestic actors in both 
countries were able to attain reforms that met with EU praise and provided opportunities to 
consolidate democracy in line with European standards, despite the countries’ differences in 
these crucial areas.  Thus, these two cases provide a means for focused comparison in the 
previously mentioned key areas: which domestic actors coalesced around the issue of 
constitutional change, how these actors and coalitions communicated their messages in order to 
achieve change, and what influence differences in political opportunities and institutions might 
have had in the relative success of these cases. 
Individually, the cases of Romania and Serbia are extremely significant to the EU’s 
democratizing efforts in the CEE region due to their large populations and regional influence.  
Differences between the paths that each country took toward constitutional reform make the 
findings of this case study particularly interesting for countries both on the brink of EU accession 
and countries only moderately engaged in the process of EU talks.  Yet the basic commonalities 
that I will show between the two cases suggest, in general, that domestic actors seeking 
constitutional change through existing political systems do exhibit a more general pattern.  Thus, 
the lessons that can be extrapolated from a comparative study of the cases of Romania and Serbia 
have immediate implications for CEE countries as well as the broader subset of countries that 
currently seek, or might someday seek, membership in the EU.  In addition, these lessons offer 
substantial insight into the broader processes of constitutional change and democratization that 
have become critical in today’s global environment. 
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Preview of the Thesis 
This thesis aims to establish a comparative framework for looking at different types of domestic 
coalitions and the ways they play into creating constitutional change in the cases at hand.  It will 
rely on the small set of primary sources available, including official EU communications and 
other materials compiled by national political elites.  The bulk of its research will come from 
secondary sources, which include many scholarly books and journal articles as well as a diverse 
and informative collection of media releases.  Years of foreign press articles will prove crucial in 
establishing the timeline of events that led to constitutional changes in these cases, where there is 
largely a dearth of information, and will provide invaluable insight into the ways in which 
political coalitions framed their messages to successfully achieve constitutional change.   
 In the first section of this thesis, I lay out in detail the framework that I have compiled for 
empirical case analysis.  This framework delves further into the concepts of ‘bottom-up’ and 
‘top-down’ influences on policy and incorporates one theory of political systems, which was put 
forth by Pridham,
2
 as well as two theories of ways in which actors within the political system 
may influence policy change, which were put forth by Ruzza.
3
  After establishing the basic 
conceptual groundwork and a ‘matrix’ for analysis, I move first to the case of Romania, followed 
by that of Serbia.  I present the case analyses individually, providing sufficient historical 
background and accounts of the event of constitutional change for each country.  In both 
individual analyses, I interpret the empirical data within my analytical framework and draw case 
conclusions, with a specific focus on the evolution of and interactions among coalitions of 
domestic actors in promoting or resisting constitutional changes toward democracy.  Equally 
important to this analysis is the inclusion of those actors who neither support nor resist 
                                                 
2
 Geoffrey Pridham, Designing Democracy, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). 
3
 Carlo Ruzza, Europe and Civil Society, (New York: Manchester University Press/Palgrave, 2004). 
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constitutional change by either purposely choosing not to act or being unable to do so.  In the 
next section, I present a concluding comparative analysis of the two cases side-by-side.  Finally, 
the conclusion discusses the limitations of this study and questions for future research. 
 In this way, my empirical analysis aims to establish the truth of three critical claims.  
Firstly, that countries enacting constitutional change from within existing, consolidating 
democratic systems are dependent on a core group of political elites forming a coalition and 
embracing the cause of constitutional reform.  Second, that message framing and communication 
on intra-governmental and public levels makes a difference in the outcome of constitutional 
referendums, an issue that is especially relevant in countries looking to reform constitutions to 
align their governance with EU standards.  Finally, that institutional openness to change is 
indispensible to countries looking to reform constitutions in line with the Copenhagen Criteria 
within existing, consolidating democratic systems. 
 It must be noted here that this thesis is not concerned with questions of normative 
evaluations of what types of actors and actions create the best exercises of democracy.  While 
there is much scholarly debate over the merits of the democratic systems and reforms in these 
and similar cases, I am primarily concerned with the use of constitutional reform as a powerful 
instrument by which significant changes in governance, liberty, and human rights can be enacted.  
Thus, I will focus on analyzing the ways by which any such changes come into being in the first 
place, primarily as the result of domestic actors and coalitions. 
 In addition, because I approach the subject of constitutional change from a political 
science perspective, this does not represent a thesis in constitutional law.  This analysis is 
focused on the roles, structures, and actions of varying domestic coalitions in promoting, or 
resisting, systemic change.  Therefore, although I will draw occasionally from the work of legal 
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scholars, I do not purport to analyze constitutional texts or processes of constitution writing from 
a constitutional law perspective. 
 Finally, this analysis focuses on constitutional changes that arise from within existing, 
democratizing political systems.  Political scientist Carl J. Friedrich described the legitimacy 
surrounding constitutions generally as coming from decisions reached “[b]y not too few.”
4
  In 
the specific cases to be examined in detail in this paper, standards for legitimacy and 
constitutional change vary slightly by country and are predominately pre-established within the 
existing constitutional setting.  The recent histories of both Romania and Serbia are complex and 
have been marked with significant regime changes.  This thesis, however, focuses on attaining 
meaningful constitutional change in the setting of the established institutions in each nation—
through the political processes established in each country for enacting constitutional change, in 
that creating change through existing popularly supported institutions represents the most 
legitimate way to further democracy in these countries.  The most common alternative to 
legitimate democratic change from within the system is the coup d’état, which represents a very 
different imposition of change that, although worthy of discussion, is beyond the scope of this 
paper in focusing narrowly on one single important and legitimate phenomenon. 
 Although existing literature is abundant on many aspects of EU expansion, it provides too 
few examples of satisfactory comparative analysis of the roles of domestic coalitions in similar 
sets of cases.  As EU and internal negotiations are extremely current in nature, a gap naturally 
exists in scholarly analysis of the issues at hand.  In the case of Romania, one scholar noted that 
“academic analysis of Romania’s relations with the EU has been largely confined to occasional 
                                                 
4
 Carl J. Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy, (Waltham, MA: Blaisdell Publishing 
Company, 1968), 130. 
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book chapters and journal articles.”
5
  If this is the case for Romania, then it is even more so for 
Serbia, which still has a long way to go in order to even begin negotiations for EU membership.  
Finally, the timely nature of the cases I have selected ensures the relevance of this research 
within the body of scholarly literature; at the same time, this timeliness could present limitations 
relating to unforeseen future developments and gaps in information. 
  This thesis, by treating cases related to democratic development and EU expansion, 
touches upon the unique global situation of modern times and of times to come.  Remaining 
unconsolidated democracies will potentially continue to face more and more incentives from 
supranational and/or hegemonic actors to institute democratic changes from within.  This 
certainly applies to CEE countries and other applicants for EU expansion; it likewise might soon 
apply to any number of countries in the Middle East, Africa, and South and Central America.  
More broadly still, understanding the workings of domestic coalitions, as well as their relations 
with external actors and the domestic populous, allows for a deeper insight into and the 
functioning of government systems and the forces involved in creating – or resisting – change.  
The issues raised here are inextricably linked with working toward the assurance of human rights, 
minority rights, and democratic values throughout the world. 
                                                 
5
 Dimitris Papadimitriou and David Phinnemore, Romania and the European Union: From 
marginalisation to membership, (New York: Routledge, 2008), 1. 
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II. Research Design and Theoretical Framework 
 
Framework for Analyzing Domestic Coalitions as Actors: A ‘Bottom-Up’ Methodology 
In this section, I will set forth a comprehensive framework for analyzing the various domestic 
actors and advocacy coalitions that work at the national level toward, and against, constitutional 
reform.  The main contribution of this thesis is that it presents a ‘bottom-up’ approach to issues 
concerning European integration and democratic development.  Such an approach purports to 
give much-needed attention to the domestic actors that are instrumental in inducing 
constitutional change in democratic, or democratizing, societies.  As I alluded to in the 
introduction, the trend in analyzing political and economic changes in potential EU candidate 
countries has focused in recent years on evaluating the effects that the EU and other international 
institutions have on domestic policies—a ‘top-down’ approach.
6
  Here, I will put forth a much-
needed counter perspective.  This ‘bottom-up’ focus properly attributes agency to those national 
civil and political actors who design and implement national constitutional changes.  It also 
addresses the role that institutional design plays in allowing or resisting change in constitutional 
frameworks.  Just which actors are most important in shaping constitutional change in CEE 
countries?  How does institutional structure affect the ability of these actors to enact change?  
How and when are actors able to form coalitions potent enough to put forth changes in countries’ 
constitutional blueprints?  The framework established here will enable case studies of Romania 
and Serbia to provide insight into these questions and the crucial processes of democratization 
and Europeanization that will shape Europe in the future. 
In reality, it must be noted that such ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ phenomena occur 
simultaneously.  Domestic actors absorb international and external ideas, norms, and practices, 
                                                 
6
 Magen and Morlino, 26-27. 
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and in turn domestic actors influence international dialogues on constitutions, institutions, and 
democracy.  From a constitutional law standpoint, as well, Schroth and Bostan have noted that a 
switch in modern times has now made it “pointless to consider” any domestic constitutional law 
without reference to relevant international influence that shape it.
7
  For this reason, the 
framework I will lay out in the following pages carefully incorporates ‘top-down’ incentives and 
instruments, which will be highlighted in the next section.  These EU-specific incentives often 
represent a significant source of outside motivations for domestic actors.  Such motivations may 
readily be taken into account when examining the ways in which actors and coalitions behave.  
Therefore, although the framework I will use approaches the topic of constitutional change from 
a domestic, ‘bottom-up’ perspective, it does so knowing that such monumental changes do not 
take place in a vacuum and that, instead, many ‘top-down’ forces might be at play in inducing 
(or preventing) domestic political change.   
Especially regarding CEE countries, motives must also be viewed in the broader context 
of a general incentive to modernize and develop economically, socially, and politically in the 
years after communism.  While allowance for such ‘top-down’ motives is necessary in 
understanding domestic change in post-communist CEE countries, the focus of this thesis 
remains on the ways in which coalitions at the national level, which are responsible and 
responsive to a domestic public in addition to the international community, go about creating 
constitutional change. 
The main concern of this paper lies with those actors and coalitions that are directly 
involved in the process of policymaking regarding constitutional change.  Specifically, this 
framework for analysis will focus on the process of constitutional change as incorporating the 
                                                 
7
 Peter W. Schroth and Ana Daniela Bostan, “International Constitutional Law and Anti-Corruption 
Measures in the European Union’s Accession Negotiations: Romania in Comparative Perspective,” The 
International Journal of Comparative Law 52, no. 3 (2005): 633-34. 
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original impetus and motivations for revision, legislative initiatives to revise, the constitutional 
drafting procedure on a political (rather than legal) level, and the process of popular approval.  
Thus, this framework will be concerned with domestic actors and coalitions involved at every 
phase of this constitutional design and passage, as these are the actors that are crucial in creating 
constitutional change. 
In order to establish a framework for examining the success or failure of national political 
actors in creating constitutional change, the ideas of ‘domestic actors’ and ‘advocacy coalitions’ 
must be explored and defined in relation to each other and to the systems in which they exist.  
The term ‘domestic actors’ refers here to individual or institutional agents whose behaviors may 
influence policy outcomes.  Domestic actors fall within one of a variety of domains in a 
country’s political system.  By contrast, ‘advocacy coalitions’ may be thought of as groups of 
actors often representing multiple domains of action that have come together to promote an 
agreed upon idea in policy.  Sabatier’s original conception of advocacy coalitions portrayed these 
coalitions as the forces that ultimately underlie and support stable political systems.
8
  However, 
for the purposes of this analysis, I will use the term to include a type of coalition that might be 
comprised of domestic actors who have mobilized specifically for the purpose of supporting or 
resisting constitutional change, with the end goal of actually altering the policy systems 
previously upheld by older alignments of coalitions. 
Pridham establishes a structure for looking holistically at political systems and the 
various domains that comprise them.  These domains house a variety of domestic actors, whose 
collaboration yields the advocacy coalitions that are often most influential in creating widespread 
change.  According to Pridham, political systems include: 
                                                 
8
 Michael Mintrom and Sandra Vergari, “Advocacy Coalitions, Policy Entrepreneurs, and Policy 
Change,” Policy Studies Journal 24, no. 3 (1996): 420-434. 
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(a) motivational factors, (b) governance, comprising policy approaches and 
institutional aspects, (c) the political arena, including parties, the media and public 
opinion and (d) the socio-economic arena, including different interests, pressure 
groups, and civil mobilization.
9
 
 
Parts (c) and (d) of this framework describe the extent of the arenas in which domestic 
actors form coalitions and create policy change.  These arenas can also be thought of as the 
different ‘operational spheres’ where civil society functions, in the liberal democratic tradition.
10
  
Obvious actors in these spheres, with which this analysis will be concerned, include political 
parties and elites, scholarly elites, courts, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the media, 
and religious groups.  On one hand, it is more difficult to measure the effects of socio-economic 
actors because they often influence policies in indirect ways.
11
  For example, a corporation might 
want country X to open its economy and democratic system to European standards and accede to 
the EU for financial and trade benefits.  The ways in which this corporation might influence 
policies are fare from transparent—especially in notoriously corrupt CEE governments.  
However, this analysis will focus primarily on the political arena along with and the actions of 
NGOs and minority and religious groups in the socio-economic arena.  In part, this strategy will 
be adopted because of the difficulty of measuring actions of actors like corporations in the socio-
economic arena.  Primarily, though, this analysis will concentrate on political actors, NGOs, and 
minority and religious groups because of the nature of the issue of constitutional change.  Since 
such change necessarily encompasses a high-up, national scale largely in the political eye, the set 
of actors I have mentioned are truly the most relevant to constitutional change, as the case 
studies that follow will show. 
                                                 
9
 Pridham, 66. 
10
 John D. Nagle and Alison Mahr, Democracy and Democratization, (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE 
Publications, 1999), 69. 
11
 Pridham, 66. 
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In sum, then, Pridham considers types of motivations, institutions, actors, and operating 
spaces that comprise the interactive process of policy movements.  I will examine the cases of 
Romania and Serbia by studying domestic actors and advocacy coalitions in relation to all of 
these factors.  A careful analysis of the success or failure of the outputs of domestic actors and 
advocacy coalitions can only come about by such a holistic consideration of the inputs, structures, 
and acting spheres that make up the policy systems in which they operate.  
Expanding on these dimensions for analysis, I will focus on two additional, 
“complementary” perspectives identified by Ruzza.  These analytical focuses provide different 
but related approaches through which to explore Pridham’s domestic political systems.  The 
approaches of Political Opportunity Theory (‘POS’) and ‘framing’, prove very useful in drawing 
conclusions from the interactions of factors (a) through (d) above, since they examine the 
dynamics by which domestic actors and advocacy coalitions create change. Ruzza identifies a 
dual role for domestic actors and advocacy coalitions: “on the one hand they feed ideas into the 
policy processes; on the other, they act as political forces – networks of activists and 
sympathizers – organised into structures and committed to effecting social and political 
change.”
12
  The POS and framing approaches build from these basic premises of roles for 
domestic actors and advocacy coalitions as both formulators of ideas and catalysts for change. 
 The POS approach “examines the structural conditions under which movements are 
likely to achieve some sort of impact.”
13
  In other words, POS considers the institutional setting 
in which actors and coalitions function.  POS assumes that differences in institutional settings 
can affect how successful coalitions are at creating policy change.  The POS analysis considers 
the following dimensions of ‘political opportunity’: 
                                                 
12
 Ruzza, 23. 
13
 Ibid., 29. 
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The relative openness or closure of the institutionalised political system; the 
stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird 
a policy; the presence or absence of elite allies; the state’s capacity and propensity 
for repression.
14
 
 
Thus, this approach looks primarily to comparative differences in institutional and structural 
factors as determinants of the success of domestic actors and advocacy coalitions in effecting or 
resisting constitutional change.  In the cases of Romania and Serbia, this analysis will prove 
useful in controlling for institutional settings that could affect the success of policy movements. 
 Likewise, the second approach, framing, will offer different but equally significant 
insight into the question of why both countries have been able to enact constitutional change, 
even though one had much more serious prospects of joining the EU than the other.  While POS 
examines institutional and structural factors, framing focuses instead on how domestic actors and 
advocacy coalitions are able to portray their issues and standpoints, both in order to create broad 
coalitions and to gain the appeal of a voting public.  Framing “examines the impact of [social 
movements’] ideas on public discourse.”
15
  Originally put forth by Snow, et al.,
16
 a framing 
analysis looks at an advocacy coalition as a ‘social movement’ comprising an alliance of any 
variety of domestic actors moving to promote unified ideas.  Such a movement requires a so-
called ‘master frame’ of the issues at hand.  This master frame picks and chooses different 
aspects of the norms and perspectives of individual domestic actors in creating “a single 
concept” that will be relevant to a broader arrangement of actors or to the general public.  In fact, 
Ruzza explains: 
For a social movement to achieve wider support, its master frame must 
resonate with the priorities of sectors of the general public.  Movements 
                                                 
14
 Doug McAdam et al. (eds.), Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 27. 
15
 Ruzza, 29. 
16
 David A. Snow et al., “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movements Participation,” 
American Sociological Review 51 no. 4 (1986): 464-481. 
 Caitlin Wood | 17 
attempt to enhance this resonance by means of ‘frame alignment’ 
strategies whereby their frames become aligned with dominant cultural 
frames.
17
 
 
In this way, the framing approach will offer insight into the ways in which advocacy coalitions 
form from domestic actors as well as the ultimate messages that they put forth to the public 
arenas. 
 Taken together, the two framework approaches put forth by Ruzza (framing and POS) 
combined with Pridham’s political systems domains can be used to create the following matrix 
(Matrix0) for case analysis: 
Matrix0: Framework for Analysis 
 Motivations Governance 
Political 
Arena 
Socio-
Economic 
Arena 
 
Political 
Opportunities 
(POS) (Or, how 
institutions 
empower or 
restrict success) 
 
    
 
Framing (Or, 
how coalitions 
shape messages 
to gain approval) 
 
    
 
In this matrix, I propose to analyze actions toward constitutional change by examining the 
domains of political systems (motivations, governance, political arena, socio-economic arena) 
through the perspectives of framing and POS, which represent two main ways in which these 
components can affect policy outcomes. 
                                                 
17
 Ruzza, 32. 
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 Overall then, combining the POS and framing perspectives into a comprehensive analysis 
will touch upon issues of alliance building, public support and consensus forming, and 
institutional access and ability to get messages of reform across.  Using this approach, I expect to 
show three things.  First, I will show that a POS perspective reveals real institutional differences 
between Romania and Serbia that explain how Romania’s reforms came relatively naturally, 
while Serbia’s took place only after a systemic shock.  Furthermore, I will demonstrate that 
strong elite coalitions – namely, political party elites – are instrumental in constitutional change 
success and account for the ability of both countries to successfully enact constitutional change.  
This theory of the importance of political elites reflects a traditional concept of elite theory of 
politics, described by Schumpeter.
18
  In this theory, Schumpeter argued for a realist perspective 
whereby political elites serve “as the key to building and maintaining a stable democracy,” as 
opposed to a “democratic ideal” of governance by all citizens.
19
  In both Romania and Serbia, 
shifts that allowed coalitions of political elites to form were the primary factors behind allowing 
constitutional change.  Finally, I will establish that message framing and communication with 
voters is necessary for the successful adoption of constitutional referendums. 
 
Conceptualizing EU Incentives and Instruments for Change: The ‘Top-Down’ Perspective 
As I mentioned in the previous section, it is particularly useful to comprehend in a quick 
overview the ways in which the European Union and other international actors may influence 
policy developments—a ‘top-down’
20
 perspective on domestic policy change.  Of special interest 
is the ability of these organizations to influence the motivations of domestic actors to act toward 
or against constitutional change.  In this way, the recent waves of constitutional change in CEE 
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countries have been greatly influenced by the varying incentive structures that exist for each 
country to join the EU.  Other groups that offer strong incentives for CEE countries include the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Council of Europe, and various NGOs.  
However, the most noteworthy policy influences on CEE countries from external organizations 
have, in fact, come from the EU.
21
  The case study of Romania will reveal a country particularly 
incentivized by its strong prospects of joining the EU, while the case of Serbia demonstrates that 
countries more ambivalent toward joining the EU often proceed through different paths toward 
constitutional change.  In this way, a country’s degree of external motivation, especially from the 
EU, will play a large role in the ways in which it goes about developing democratic systems and 
constitutions.  Thus, this section will briefly explain the potential ‘pull’ of the EU due to its high 
influence in the CEE region.  However, where especially relevant, this thesis will from time to 
time address specific events concerning other organizations or governments that may be 
particularly relevant to constitutional outcomes in the cases at hand. 
 Entrance into the EU presents economic, political, geographical, and strategic incentives 
to its potential entrant countries.  While each country faces drawbacks associated with joining 
the EU, often proportional to the amounts of domestic institutional or ideological change 
required by EU accession, the interest of all of these countries in gaining to membership status in 
the EU has been expressed in the countries’ formal relations with the EU and in the internal 
changes that have been realized in recent years.  Schmidt explains that, even though the EU 
began as an economic union, out of all comparable unions within Europe,  
only the EU has developed a single currency, a single market, a single voice in 
international trade negotiation, a single antitrust authority, common policies on 
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environmental protection, worker safety and health a common foreign and 
security policy, and even the beginnings of a common defense policy.
22
   
 
The regional influence of the EU and its specific impact on trade and security policies thus 
presents a tremendous incentive to nations to conform to its membership standards.  In turn, 
these standards are necessary in order to ensure the homogeneity in political and economic 
conditions that is needed for the functioning of the union.
23
 
Grabbe presents one view of EU power relations as she theorizes that an asymmetry 
exists in negotiating powers between many CEE nations and the EU itself.  This asymmetry 
allots far greater bargaining power to the EU in determining entrance conditions and norms.  
Remarking on concessions made to the EU by several CEE nations in 2001 that seemed to go 
against the interests of these countries, Grabbe describes an “asymmetrical dependence on [the 
EU],” where these states “wanted membership far more than the current member-states wanted 
to accept them.”
24
  This phenomenon, coupled with a long-term perspective of the benefits of EU 
membership, explain why many CEE countries have accepted seemingly unfavorable conditions 
in order to gain membership in the EU. 
According to Grabbe, one further dimension, Europeanization, must be accounted for in 
considering the willingness of these countries to sacrifice their perceived immediate interests in 
EU accession negotiations.  She envisions Europeanization as a process by which CEE countries 
have adapted and continue to adapt to European norms in their own political negotiations and 
debates.
25
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 Taken together, then, these elements give a foundation for the EU’s potential role in 
influencing national policies concerning democratization and constitutional change.  CEE 
countries retain strong incentives – economic, political, and otherwise – for working to comply 
with EU norms.  Meanwhile, current EU member countries and the Union itself possess a higher 
level of negotiating power than the prospective member states.  This produces a greater 
compliance with EU norms by negotiating candidates, and less actual negotiation.  Finally, the 
phenomenon of more compliance / less negotiation can be further explained by the effects of 
Europeanization, which leads negotiating members of interested countries to be more inclined to 
support rather than oppose standards set for them by the existing European community. 
The EU possesses a variety of mechanisms for influencing national policy, both through 
accession conditionality and through other means.
26
  Here I will briefly present the various tools 
that the EU possesses in exerting its influence on countries wishing to accede.  Much of the 
model presented here has been developed by Grabbe in her research on EU-CEE country 
negotiations.  Several of these mechanisms will become relevant in analyzing individual cases 
and domestic actors’ behaviors in conforming to EU pressures later on. 
 In 1993, the European Council put forth a set of conditions for entry, known today as the 
Copenhagen Criteria, stated in Figure 1, below.  These conditions “were designed to minimise 
the risk of new entrants becoming politically unstable and economically burdensome to the 
existing EU.”
27
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Figure 1: The EU’s Copenhagen Criteria28 
 
EU Membership Requires: 
o that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
respect for and protection of minorities, 
o the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the 
capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces 
within the Union. 
o The candidate’s ability to take on the obligations of membership 
including adherence to the aims of political, economic and 
monetary union. 
 
Therefore, in order to begin negotiations for membership, each country must have successfully 
fulfilled these conditions, which include democratic standards.  A country applying to join the 
EU submits its application to the European Council, which decides on accepting the application 
based on a formal opinion provided by the European Commission based on these criteria.
29
 
In 1998, the EU began to issue Accession Partnerships
30
 to states in the process of 
beginning negotiations.  Accession Partnerships comprise non-binding lists of objectives, more 
specific than the vaguely outlined Copenhagen Criteria, for each nation in the short and medium 
term.  A country’s progress on these Accession Partnerships is likewise monitored by the 
European Commission.  Grabbe notes that “Accession Partnerships limited the scope of 
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negotiations by making a number of potentially negotiable areas part of the conditions, 
and…they increased the scope of EU involvement in domestic policy-making.”
31
  
Further, a negotiating country is required to fully accept, apply, implement, and enforce 
the EU’s acquis communautaire, which “is made up of the entirety of EU legislation…[and] is 
the shared foundation of rights and obligations binding all Member States.”
32
  The acquis covers 
some 35 chapters that range in topic from free movement of workers and goods and foreign, 
security, and defense policy to judiciary and fundamental rights and justice, freedom, and 
security.
33
  A country’s progress in adopting the acquis is also monitored by the European 
Commission, which issues regular reports on individual negotiating countries’ progress.
34
  Once 
all chapters of the acquis have been closed by unanimous agreement by EU member states, the 
country can move forth in the process of ratifying an accession treaty.
35
  The various steps taken 
by the EU during this process can strongly influence candidates’ policy decisions based on the 
prospect of EU accession.  Table 1, below, synthesizes several descriptions presented by Grabbe 
that illustrate the various mechanisms for ‘policy transfer’ that the EU may use during the 
accession conditionality period. 
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Table 1: Grabbe’s Mechanisms for EU Policy Transfer to Candidate and Potential 
Candidate Countries36 
 
Instrument Types of examples Type of influence Leverage exerted on 
policy 
Models: Legislative 
and institutional 
templates 
Policy Documents; 
White Papers; 
Legally Binding 
Agreements 
Guidelines directly 
related to EU 
acceptance; Some 
legally enforceable 
Very influential - 
direct link with 
accession; Binding 
agreements could be 
publicly enforced 
Money: Aid and 
technical assistance 
Aid programs Conditionality for 
financial and other 
benefits; Transfer of 
practices and norms 
to national 
bureaucracies 
Mixed results; Focus 
more on aid directly 
related to accession 
logistics now 
Benchmarking and 
monitoring 
Ranking, Regular 
Reports 
Not enforceable but 
directly linked with 
accession prospects  
Influence through 
direct link with 
accession prospects  
Advice and 
twinning 
Twinning program;
37
 
Expert advice, 
bureaucracy-to-
bureaucracy 
contacts, Multilateral 
institutional contact 
Routinization of 
practices; absorption 
of EU ideas and 
norms by national 
bureaucrats and 
institutions 
Long-term indirect 
influence, taking EU 
practices to the heart 
of policy-making  
Gate-keeping: 
Access to 
negotiations and 
further stages in the 
accession process 
Denying further 
stages on 
conditionality 
Strongly linked to 
accession incentives 
Effectiveness 
depends on how 
policy solutions are 
laid out and if ntl 
officials will follow 
Soft methods: 
Indirect effects 
Leading by example 
of EU members; 
Influence of private 
sector actors 
Can lead to adoption 
of EU policies and 
practices through 
observation and 
through competition 
Difficult to measure; 
influence depends 
on implementation 
and type of private 
sector actors and 
competition 
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 The background offered in this section should serve as a reference as specific EU actions 
begin to take on meaning in the cases of Romania and Serbia’s constitutional development.  This 
general laying out of the various instruments and mechanisms by which the EU promotes its own 
norms of democracy and free markets within potential member countries should be kept in mind 
when considering from where domestic actors gain their own motivations and perspectives on 
democratization and constitutional change.  Thus, having completed a ‘bottom-up’ framework 
along with an overview of possible ‘top-down’ external incentives and influences for domestic 
actors, I will move to the specific cases of Romania and Serbia in order to assess the ways in 
which these domestic actors and coalitions go about creating constitutional change.
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III. Case Study One: Romania 
 
Historical Background 
Romania’s approved constitutional referendum of 2003 contained a multitude of provisions to 
address EU concerns in promoting democracy and the protection of human rights and minorities.  
This revamped constitution, making these and more provisions to align Romania’s protection of 
rights and democracy with EU standards, was approved in a two-day referendum that featured a 
large push by national and local-level authorities to drum up sufficient turnout.  With a 55.7% 
turnout of eligible voters, the new constitution received an 89.7% approval.
38
  In the case of 
Romania, this tremendous motion for constitutional change came at the hands of a coalition of 
political parties that had, in fact, framed the referendum as a vote on EU accession in order to 
bring voters to the polls.
39
   
A closer examination of the events leading up to this referendum and the positioning of 
domestic coalitions will reveal the types of alliances and actions by coalitions of political parties 
in particular that were necessary to pass these wide-reaching changes.  The in-depth 
consideration given here to Romania’s political development since communism is especially 
pertinent for two reasons.  First, the country’s history remains generally unknown by many in the 
United States.  Second, Romania’s political culture resulting from its authoritarian communist 
years had significant impact, especially on its citizens’ collective mentality toward democracy
40
 
and on its long transformation away from communism even after the official end of the 
communist regime in 1989. 
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The closing of EU negotiations in 2004 and Romania’s official accession to the EU in 
January 2007 served as the most recent reminders of the strides toward standards of democracy, 
human rights, and rule of law that Romania has taken since its fall from communism in 1989.  
Romania’s failure to be considered with the first wave of CEE countries that negotiated for EU 
membership (including the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia) was a reflection of its own unique historical, economic, and political 
trajectory.  Recognizing Romania’s strong EU incentive, I will consider the country’s relations 
with the EU in tracing its democratic development and eventual constitutional revision in 2003.  
Romania’s lag behind other CEE countries in transforming toward consolidated democracy and 
meeting EU standards has largely been attributed to the slowness of the country’s political elites 
in truly escaping the country’s communist past, an aspect that will come to light through the 
ensuing discussion of Romania’s history leading up to its 2003 constitutional amendments and 
2007 EU membership. 
 The year 1989 saw the toppling of the communist regime of Romanian President Nicolae 
Ceauşescu.  Ceauşescu had succeeded Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej
41
 as the leader of the Romanian 
Communist Party in 1965, and was in part known for his consolidation of Dej’s policies of 
reducing Romanian dependence on Russia, despite the party’s communist domestic policies.
42
  
As Ceauşescu continued where Dej left off, Romania became an exception among communist 
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countries due to its general resistance to various Soviet policies during the Cold War years.
43
  
For this reason, during much of his presidency and in spite of his communist standpoint, 
Ceauşescu held the favor of many Western countries.  However, under Ceauşescu and his wife, 
this communist regime became increasingly more despotic in its nationalist internal politics in 
the 1980s,
44
 as devotion to the communist ideology faded while economic ‘hard times’ ensued.
45
  
In 1988, the European Parliament’s Directorate General for Committees and Delegations referred 
to Romania as “the most repressive country in Eastern Europe.”
46
  Romania saw great levels of 
oppression and the beginnings of resistance forming from within Ceauşescu’s own party.  In the 
end, the country’s severe hardships fueled a quick attempt by Ceauşescu and his wife to flee 
amongst violent protests and shootings.  The couple was detained by a military tribunal for 
crimes of genocide.  Upon being found guilty, the Ceauşescus were subsequently executed by 
firing squad on December 25, 1989—the bullet count totaling nearly 200 shots.
47
 
 The consequences of this dark tradition of communism and dictatorship would prove 
significant throughout the period of political reconstruction and democratization that followed.  
Under Ceauşescu, the repression of any dissenting parties meant, first of all, that his final 
downfall necessarily came from within, and, secondly, that talks of restoration after his 
assassination were hampered by the absence of organized opposing groups.  Keil notes: 
In almost all of the communist states in East Central Europe, there had been a 
number of “round table” talks between the party and various opposition groups.  
These talks had helped define the ways that the societies in question would 
extricate themselves from communism…Romania did not have the benefit of such 
conversations.
48
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The broader implications of this on political culture must be equally noted.  Keil suggests that 
the overthrow of Ceauşescu’s regime was not a protest against communism, but rather “an 
example of what Max Weber called a ‘traditionalist revolution’…against a master because 
he…has failed to observe the traditional limits of his power and has failed to meet his traditional 
responsibilities and obligations to his subjects.”
49
  The failure of Romanians to truly reject 
communism was compounded by the fact that Romania had never in its history embraced a 
strong tradition of democracy.
50
  Romania’s lack of organized and developed political 
alternatives had significant consequences in the years that followed fall of the Ceauşescus.  
 Just days before the execution of the Ceauşescus, the formation of the National Salvation 
Front (FSN) had been made public with Ion Iliescu as its head.  Iliescu had been the most 
prominent of anti-Ceauşescu conspirators, despite his involvement in the Romanian Communist 
Party.
51
  Although Iliescu claimed ongoing allegiance to the ideas of socialism, his FSN initially 
took a technocratic approach to reforming governance in Romania.  Gallagher speculates that, 
due to the single-mindedness that prevailed under Ceauşescu, Iliescu and the FSN failed to 
foresee the conflicts and opposing viewpoints that would arise.
52
  Nevertheless, the FSN laid out 
an immediate program that they would seek to follow, including such measures as “the 
introduction of a democratic, pluralist form of government and the abolition of the leading role 
of a single party; the holding of free elections; separation of powers;…observance of the rights 
and freedoms of ethnic minorities,” and the introduction of various economic measures to 
mitigate the damage that had been done to the Romanian economy under Ceauşescu.
53
  However, 
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much of the FSN leadership was composed of members who had served in high-ranking 
positions in Ceauşescu’s communist regime, including Iliescu himself.  Questions of the 
legitimacy of the FSN as the ruling party came to light in some sectors of the public, while 
opposition parties, both new and older parties which had previously been banned under the 
dictatorship, began to form.
54
 
 In May 1990, the first post-communist elections were held.  Despite the formation of 
several opposing parties, Iliescu’s FSN won both the presidency (with 85.1% of the vote) and the 
vast majority of seats in parliament.  Quite simply, the FSN held elections before opponents had 
enough time to organize themselves nearly as much as the ruling FSN.
55
  However, the FSN’s 
hold on national politics was not to remain intact.  Economic struggles, unemployment, ethnic 
minority issues, miners’ invasions known as mineradas, developing underground markets, and 
organizing labor unions all posed serious problems to the party’s standing.  The third minerada, 
which took place in September 1991, resulted in violence between police and protesting miners, 
who had received support from citizens of Bucharest where they were protesting.  This event 
drew a major split in the FSN, as President Iliescu dismissed his Prime Minister, Petre Roman, 
who he blamed for economic problems and unrest.  Roman instantly went from longtime ally to 
rival as he denounced Iliescu and formed his own party.
56
   
In September, immediately before the splintering of the FSN, Romanian citizens 
overwhelmingly passed the country’s democratic constitution of 1991, which became the 
groundwork for the subsequent 2003 revisions.  Drafted by an academic who had won an 
independent seat in the parliament, the constitution promoted a centralized democratic 
government and defined the country’s official language as Romanian.  It received approval from 
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the FSN parliament and widespread approval across Romania, with notable exceptions coming 
only from two Hungarian-speaking counties.
57
 
 On an international level, the EU had become inundated with the prospect of enlarging its 
membership to absorb Romania and the rest of the newly democratizing CEE countries that had 
emerged from communism around the same time.  In 1990, the EU developed an official 
association strategy for its enlargement to include the CEE countries.  Earlier that year, 
Romania’s EU ties had solidified as it began to receive monetary assistance from the EU’s Phare 
program, designed to help economic development and transition in CEE countries.
58
  However, 
the decision to leave Romania (along with Bulgaria) out of the first round of accession 
negotiations  was based on Romania’s questionable elections in 1990 that had returned 
communist party members to office, and on a notorious outburst of government violence at a 
student rally that year.
59
  The European Parliament stated: 
Political reform is lagging.  It is still not clear whether the revolution was not, in 
fact, a coup.  The new government, the [FSN], consists mainly of ex-communists.  
There are doubts as to the freedom of the elections last year.  Democratisation of 
the decision making process has not yet been achieved.  Human rights are still 
being violated.
60
 
 
Despite the splintering of the FSN, Iliescu retained the support of a majority of members 
of parliament, who formed the Party of Social Democracy of Romania (PDSR).  The PDSR 
again won elections in 1992 and Iliescu entered into a second term as president.  His presidency 
from 1992-1996 was marked by both international achievements and domestic struggle, as the 
party became increasingly fragmented toward the end of his term.  On one hand, Romania under 
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Iliescu exhibited significant amounts of corruption, which was recognized by citizens
61
 and the 
international community alike.
62
  On the other, it reached an accord with Hungary concerning 
border disputes and the condition of Hungarians within Romania,
63
 a move that was 
internationally promoted by the Council of Europe, but was also criticized from Romania’s own 
nationalist front.
64
  Additionally, despite Romania’s questionable status on issues of corruption 
and human rights, developments in the CEE region, including the Yugoslavian conflict, made the 
EU’s European Council move to authorize the creation of Europe Agreements with Romania and 
Bulgaria, beginning in May of 1992.
65
  Thus, even as support for Iliescu waned within the 
coalitions that had previously supported him in Romania largely due to corruption in his regime, 
he managed to push forward talks with the EU that would eventually lead to constitutional 
developments toward democratizing for accession. 
The 1996 elections, in which Iliescu barely put up a fight as the candidate for the PDSR, 
made it clear that his support had eroded as he lost on a runoff that was swayed by the nationalist 
blocs, which had turned their support away from him.
66
  He was defeated by Emil 
Constantinescu of the Romanian Democratic Convention (CDR), a loose center-right coalition.  
Parliamentary power was now split among some five parties, with an alliance that included the 
CDR and the Social Democratic Union (USD) led by ex-Prime Minster Roman.
67
  The 1996 
elections represented a critical turning point in the international perspective of the country, 
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whose democracy was seen as more consolidated due to the electoral victory of a non ex-
communist party. 
In office, Constantinescu did not fare much better with his center-right policies than his 
ex-communist predecessor in addressing Romania’s domestic problems.  Economic problems 
continued to plague the nation, and parliamentary politics were marked by a state of “chaos” and 
inefficiency.
68
  Furthermore, the European Commission maintained in 1997 that Romania had 
not yet fulfilled the Copenhagen Criteria for EU accession.  The Commission noted that 
President Constantinescu had declared the opening of EU negotiations to be a top priority in 
Romania’s interest.  Additionally, the Commission communicated its appreciation of the change 
in leadership away from ex-communist officials brought about by the elections of 1996.  
However, it expressed concern over the delayed implementation of various economic and 
logistical agreements under a timetable established in Romania’s Europe Agreement.  The 
Commission wrote that “Romania is on the way to satisfying the political criteria set by the 
European Council at Copenhagen,” after noting that additional improvements were still needed 
in areas of anti-corruption, human and minority rights (specifically, for the Roma people), 
general individual rights, and judicial system reform.
69
  
By November 1998, the Commission had declared in its annual progress report that 
“Romania fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria.”  It stated: 
Continued efforts have been made to respect and protect the rights of the 
Hungarian minority and to carry through reforms concerning the situation of 
children in orphanages.  Nonetheless, much still remains to be done in rooting out 
corruption, improving the working of the courts and protecting individual liberties 
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and the rights of the Roma.  Priority should also be given to reform of the public 
administration.
70
 
 
By this time, the European Commission felt that Romania had met basic standards of “stability 
of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and 
protection of minorities,” as outlined in the Copenhagen Criteria.  The EU was now willing to 
consider negotiating for membership.  Although the Commission still retained many doubts over 
the condition of Romania’s economy, for political expediency given the Kosovo conflict and the 
EU’s strategic political interests, it recommended the opening of accession negotiations with 
Romania (and Bulgaria) in October 1999.  This represented a significant shift in the EU’s 
enlargement policy, from a technocratic to a political approach, which pushed Romania through 
to candidate status with relatively few changes in political and economic conditions over the year 
before.
71
  The negotiations phase would potentially entail additional political adjustments, but the 
EU had agreed to at least begin to negotiate with Romania with regard to accession 
conditionality.  After being authorized by the European Council, accession negotiations for 
Romania began in February 2000, with an accession goal of January 1, 2007 set for Romania.
72
 
 In 2000, the CDR-led government collapsed, resulting in the replacement of officials in 
office by other members of the CDR coalition.  Still, the EU continued to support Romania’s 
broader efforts toward democratic political consolidation while noting concerns in annual reports 
that echoed those of 1998 and 1999.
73
  Under the CDR coalition, a lack of demonstrable progress 
was even more acute on an economic level and led to the coalition’s fragmentation and the return 
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of the PDSR and Iliescu to power when the Constantinescu failed to seek reelection.  The 
alliance that the PDSR worked to form had made a strong commitment to working toward EU 
accession.  As the EU brought forward a ‘big bang’ plan for enlargement to include CEE 
countries in 2004, it became clear that Romania would have to sit the round out until its earliest 
target of 2007.
74
 
It was at this time—with the return of the Iliescu PDSR coalition to power—that 
Romania’s prospects of EU integration in the near future had finally crystallized into reality, and 
2007 began to look like a reasonable target for accession.  The movement to consolidate political 
commitments to democracy and human rights through constitutional amendments had, for a 
second time since 1989, come to light. 
 
“Yes to Europe”: An Overview and Analysis of the 2003 Constitutional Revisions 
On October 19, 2003, at the end of a two-day referendum where some 55.7% of registered voters 
turned out, Romania voted overwhelmingly to replace its constitution of 1991 with an amended 
version.
75
  I will make the case that the actual forces for creating the coalition that passed this 
constitution were set into motion with the 2000 presidential and parliamentary elections.  By 
tracing the events and coalition changes that followed these elections until the successful 
adoption of Romania’s constitutional amendments in 2003, I will establish the foundations for 
presenting a final analysis of the aspects of ‘Political Opportunities’ and ‘framing’ that were 
behind the passage of these reforms.  In considering the coalitions that formed around the issue 
of constitutional change in Romania, I will specifically consider the tenets of Pridham’s theory 
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of political systems, namely motivational factors, governance, the political arena, and the socio-
economic arena.
76
 
This new constitution was expressly geared toward priming Romania for EU accession.  
A general summary of the constitutional changes offers an overview of the complete package of 
amendments that voters approved.  Many of these amendments addressed key topics of 
democracy, human rights, minority rights, and the rule of law, which appear in the right-hand 
column of Table 2.  Later, I will contextualize the coalition building and methodology that led 
voters to choose to approve these amendments in full. 
Table 2: Summary of 2003 Changes to Romanian Constitution77 
 
Article Revision Area(s) Affected 
41 Private property “guaranteed” by government; not 
only “protected” as under 1991 constitution 
Economic Liberty 
41 Forbids nationalization of private property on ethnic, 
racial, or religious grounds 
Human & Minority 
Rights; Economic Liberty 
41 Extends right to own property to foreign citizens EU-Required; Economic 
Liberty 
46 Provides protection for the disabled Human Rights 
52 Ends previous constitution’s mandatory military 
conscription  
Personal Liberty 
69 Restricts immunity of members of parliament Corruption 
73 Allows legislative initiatives to be introduced by 
minimum 100,000 citizens instead of 250,000 before 
Democratic Process 
83 Extends president’s term to five years (from four) to 
stagger parliamentary and presidential elections 
Democratic Process 
106 Forbids president from removing prime minister from 
office 
Democratic Process; 
Corruption 
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114 Meant to quicken notoriously slow legislative process 
and limit use of emergency orders by legislature 
Democratic Process 
125 Ensures judicial independence Democratic process 
127 Entitles ethnic minority citizens to use native minority 
language in courts 
Human & Minority 
Rights 
135 Narrows definition of “public property,” promotes 
privatization, and returns communications networks to 
private property status 
Economic Liberty 
145 Inserts new article on “Euro-Atlantic Integration;” 
Among other things, permits accession to EU through 
parliamentary vote, without referendum 
EU-Specific 
 
As Table 2, above, shows, the constitution of 2003 enshrined additional protections for 
minorities (rights to language use), personal liberties (property rights), and mechanisms for 
improving the government’s inefficient democracy.  In the next few pages, I will explain how 
actors—primarily within Romania’s political arena—were the leaders of this constitutional 
change and how they were able to succeed in enacting such change through an overt focus on 
attaining EU membership. 
 The 2000 elections resulted in the return to power of the PDSR.  This victory more 
accurately reflected an expression of disaffection with the way the CDR coalition had governed 
under Constantinescu than it did a vote for return of Iliescu.
78
  Tables 3 and 4 that follow 
illustrate the change in political party support between the 1996 and 2000 in the presidential and 
parliamentary elections (showing Chamber of Deputies’, but not Senatorial).  Several important 
trends stick out within these data.  In 1996, the governing CDR coalition that had supported 
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Constantinescu’s presidential candidacy was made up of several parties combined.  Overall, the 
CDR represented a center-right ‘coalition of coalitions’
79
 that came to power primarily due to the 
Table 3: Romanian Chamber of Deputies Election Results, 1996–200080 
 
Party: PDSR CDR PD/USD PNL1 UDMR PRM PUNR/AN 
1996 Vote Share 21.5% 30.2% 12.9% n/a 6.6% 4.5% 4.4% 
1996 No. of Seats 91 122 53 n/a 25 19 18 
1996 Seat Share 26.5% 35.6% 15.5% n/a 7.3% 5.5% 5.3% 
2000 Vote Share 36.6% 5.0% 7.0% 7.0% 6.8% 19.5% 1.4% 
2000 No. of Seats 155 0 31 30 27 84 0 
2000 Seat Share 44.9% 0% 8.9% 8.7% 7.8% 24.3% 0% 
1 In 1996 much of the current PNL was part of CDR, although one faction ran on separate lists,  
getting 1.9 % of votes and no seats. 
 
 
 
Table 4: Romanian Presidential Election Results, 1996–2000 
(Percentages) 
 
 Ion 
Iliescu 
Emil 
Constan-
tinescu 
Theodor 
Stolojan 
Mugur 
Isarescu 
Petre 
Roman 
Corneliu 
Vadim 
Tudor 
Gheor-
ghe 
Funar 
Party: PDSR1 CDR PNL CDR 
20002 
PD PRM UDMR 
1996—I 32.3 28.2 n/a n/a 20.6 4.7 6 
1996—II 45.6 54.4 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
2000—I 36.4 n/a 11.7 9.6 3.0 28.3 6.2 
2000—II 66.8 n/a n/a n/a n/a 33.2 n/a 
1 After the 2000 elections, the PDSR became the PSD 
2Even though Isarescu nominally ran as an independent, he received the official endorsement of 
CDR 2000. 
Note: Romanian presidential elections require victory by a simple majority of votes.  It is common for no one 
candidate to receive greater than 50% during the first round election, after which a runoff is held between the 
top two vote getters to determine a winner by simple majority. 
 
splintering of Iliescu’s PDSR by the end of its 1992-1996 mandate.  However, both the 
presidential and parliamentary election results show that, by 2000, the CDR had fragmented.  In 
Table 3, by 2000 the National Liberty Party (PNL) that emerged from the CDR had fewer than 
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25% of the seats held by the CDR in the previous term, while the CDR itself dropped to 0 seats.  
The CDR had also included smaller partners in its coalition.  The Hungarian Democratic Union 
(UDMR), which had supported the CDR alliance, managed to hold on to its votes for parliament 
and the presidency—largely due to its ethnic support base.  Meanwhile, the Democratic Party 
(PD) of the center-left also lost significant amounts of support in the presidential and 
parliamentary elections due to its support of the CDR.
81
 
 Overall, this represented a “shrinking of the center,” which led to victories for the farther-
left PDSR and President Iliescu, as well as the nationalist right-wing Greater Romania Party 
(PRM).  This phenomenon resulted mostly from the inability of the centrist parties to coalesce 
around a single platform and presidential candidate in the aftermath of the collapsing CDR.
 82
  
Pop-Eleches notes that the last-minute push for Iliescu’s victory in 2000 by civil society activists 
and Western organizations prevented a “dangerous drift toward extremism” that would have seen 
a right-wing, nationalist agenda permanently alter Romania’s course toward European 
integration.
83
 
The priority of European integration, helping to facilitate democratic consolidation, had 
also shifted over the years in the minds of Romanians.  Under Iliescu before 1996, the PDSR 
government had shown ambiguous enthusiasm for joining the EU.  PDSR rhetoric increasingly 
supported European integration and the completion of Romania’s 1995 application for accession, 
but it demonstrated a lack of substantive support and understanding of what integration would 
entail, politically and economically speaking.
84
  In addition, the nationalist PRM and the 
Hungarian UDMR had been substantively opposed to joining the EU, as was the Romanian 
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Orthodox Church, all due to an overarching perception of a uniquely Romanian culture that 
should remain separate from a “neoimperialist” West.
85
 
Yet, despite these countercurrents, general sentiment among Romanians remained strong 
in the mid-1990s that “Europe” instead represented “the source of the political and economic 
forms Romania should adopt.”
86
  Romania has consistently polled at high levels compared to 
most other CEE countries in its perception of EU membership.  Despite what politicians outside 
of the CDR may have believed, “by the mid-1990s it was clear that there were votes to be had in 
supporting integration,”
87
 (emphasis added).  This strong support for the EU is seen in Figure 2, 
below. 
Figure 2: Percent of Romanians with “Positive” Opinion of EU88 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The 1996 election of the CDR provided support for a coalition that embodied a more genuine 
ideological alignment with ideas of European integration and democratization.  With support 
among Romanians still polling high and prospects for EU accession looking more realistic than 
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ever, the PDSR had likewise fully embraced the priority of European integration by the electoral 
shift of 2000.   
Very quickly, Iliescu’s party demonstrated its newfound willingness to act toward the 
political, economic, and structural goals it would have to fulfill in order to join the EU.  These 
were goals that had been pursued under Constantinescu, but goals which Constantinescu’s weak 
government had failed to successfully mobilize a coalition in order to complete.  In effect, Iliescu 
and his PDSR had reversed its previously hesitant position toward the EU after having seen the 
country’s progress in negotiating with the EU and the widespread support that EU accession 
received in Romania.  As part of its pro-Europe electoral agenda in 2000, the PDSR supported 
amending the constitution to address issues of institutional compatibility between the EU and the 
Constitution of 1991, while working toward constitutional democratization, individual and 
minority rights protection, judicial independence, and economic liberties.
89
  Furthermore, in 
December 2000, before the runoff presidential election that eventually declared victory for 
Iliescu, Petre Roman (Iliescu’s former rival) of the PD and leaders of the PNL formally 
expressed their support for drafting constitutional amendments in parliament, in cooperation with 
the PDSR.
90
  Thus, the foundation for a coalition that could agree to constitutional amendments 
was already in place; this coalition stretched across party lines and former rivalries to agree on 
the overwhelmingly popular objective of EU accession.  The PDSR became known as the Social 
Democratic Party (PSD), and it sought out an alliance with the Hungarian UDMR to bolster 
support for what remained a PSD parliamentary minority.  This was in sharp contrast to the 
previous PDSR government that had largely left the Hungarians out of its decision-making 
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process.
91
  Whereas Iliescu had previously shown a commitment that fell short of fully 
implementing the necessary political and economic reforms for accession to the EU, continued 
public support for EU membership and the friendly EU relations established during 
Constantinescu’s presidency meant that, upon taking office at the end of 2000, Iliescu’s pro-
Europe coalition solidified its EU commitment by working toward necessary constitutional 
reforms. 
The process of drafting a revised constitution took until June 2003, with a parliamentary 
committee representing major parties leading the way until debates were opened up in June for 
the Chamber of Deputies and August for the Senate.   In March, the coalition initiating the 
constitutional proposal stated, “the principal objective of this proposal . . .is to guarantee the 
constitutional foundation for achieving integration [within NATO and the European Union],” a 
purpose that was understood to include issues of judicial independence, separation of powers, 
and protections of private property.
92
  This overt focus on integration with the EU (and NATO) 
guided the final version of the constitution, containing the provisions mentioned on pages 36-37, 
through the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies in a joint session that took place from August 
25-29, 2003.  However, tensions with the nationalist PRM continued to rise; PRM members had 
not participated in parliamentary debates and were subsequently angered by their exclusion from 
the committee deciding on a reconciled final draft to appear before the Senate and Chamber of 
Deputies.
93
  While the PSD had managed to build a large majority coalition that included the PD, 
PNL, and UDMR, the PRM remained the only major party that opposed the constitutional 
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revision, and its large voter share in the 2000 parliamentary elections posed a concern for 
successfully passing a constitutional referendum. 
After minimal revisions in the parliamentary houses, the draft overwhelmingly passed 
parliament (without PRM support).  Next, Romania’s constitution required that the constitutional 
revisions be put to a referendum.  Consistent with the legislature’s intention in passing the 
referendum, the government moved to promote it under the slogan “Yes to Europe.”
94
  The pro-
constitution coalition campaigned for the passage of the referendum, including notable reaches 
by the UDMR to mobilize the Hungarian minority.  This effort by the PSD coalition to frame the 
referendum around the issue of EU accession reflected public support levels for EU membership 
that had grown even further since the mid-1990s.  The levels of Romanian support for EU 
membership from 2001 through 2003 compared with averages of support among all candidate 
countries are seen in Table 5: 
Table 5: Romanian Public Opinion on EU Membership95 
 
EU Membership 
Viewed as: 
 2001 (Autumn) 2002 (Autumn) 2003 (Autumn) 
‘a good thing’ Romanian 
Public 
80% 78% 81% 
 Candidate 
Country 
Average 
59% 61% 62% 
‘neither good nor 
bad’ 
Romanian 
Public 
11% 8% 10% 
 Candidate 
Country 
Average 
22% 22% 22% 
‘a bad thing’ Romanian 
Public 
2% 2% 2% 
 Candidate 
Country 
Average 
10% 10% 10% 
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Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer (2002:1; 2002:2; 2003:4; 2004:1) (via 
ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cceb_en.htm) 
Note: Candidate Average includes opinions from CEE Countries, Malta and Turkey 
 
Despite this high support for EU integration, uncertainty over whether voters would actually turn 
out led the government to extend the referendum from one to two days’ length, to be held on 
October 18-19, 2003.  The government’s concerns about the feasibility of passing this 
referendum were largely grounded.  As one analyst pointed out, “the government has much more 
to lose if [the referendum] doesn’t pass than to win if it does.”
96
  Despite the launch of the 
Romanian Society for Democracy by ex-Prime Minister Roman as a citizens’ watchdog group, 
public debate on the referendum lagged; indicators were clear that it might not receive as much 
support as the idea of EU accession itself.  Further, the Romanian Institute for Public Policies 
estimated that just 5% of Romanians had “an acceptable” knowledge of the referendum, just two 
days before voting was to take place.
97
  One citizen noted that “people in the countryside think 
they are voting for [President] Iliescu.”
98
  Thus, the referendum results would be only somewhat 
tied to the government’s campaign of saying “Yes to Europe” and also tied to what citizens 
thought of PSD’s ability to govern. 
In addition to the question of whether its message had sunk in with voters, the 
government had to accept that the far-right PRM, with 33% of the presidential vote in 2000, had 
called for all party members to boycott the referendum entirely,
99
 since the referendum could not 
pass without a majority of voters at the polls.  Even more uncertainty came with the knowledge 
that an estimated 20% of registered voters were thought to have left Romania for better work 
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conditions in Western Europe.
100
  A majority vote was still feasible, but would require an 
unusually active role on the part of citizens in getting to the polls.  On the other hand, the 
Orthodox Church, which had previously been against Europeanization, endorsed voting in favor 
of the referendum as a “Christian responsibility.”
101
 
 The referendum voting opened to an extremely slow start on the first day, followed by a 
large increase in voter turnout during the second day, when numbers steadily rose to a 57.7% 
turnout by the 8 p.m. closing of polls.  89.7% who voted had endorsed the amendments.
102
  That 
this number is larger than the percent (up to 80) of Romanians actually supporting EU accession 
is not surprising; voter turnout undoubtedly reflected a bias toward those voters who were 
motivated enough to spend time and resources getting to the polls. 
 Even after passing these numerical tests, however, the referendum faced controversy.  
Figure 3, on page 46, depicts the increase of voters over time during the two-day referendum 
period, illustrating the phenomenon of suspiciously greater second-day turnout that raised 
outcries from the opposing PRM and NGOs alike.  For government officials, the low turnout 
rates on the first referendum day had resulted in tremendous concern over the passing of the 
constitutional revisions, the country’s future with the EU, and, importantly, the future of the PSD 
party.  Reports abounded of questionable, sometimes shocking attempts to boost participation.  
The government enlisted the help of clergymen and police officers to usher citizens from the 
streets to polls in some sites.  In Bucharest, polling boxes were placed in public markets to attract 
voters.  Election officials in the district of Cluj said that pension payments would only be 
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distributed to elderly people who voted.  There were even reports of mayors being offered free 
trips to China for demonstrating high turnout.
103
  Protests over such practices came, predictably, 
  
Figure 3: October 2003 Romanian Referendum Voting Turnout104 
Day 1           Day 2 
 
from the nationalist PRM party, who was joined by citizens’ groups like the NGO Pro 
Democracia.
105
  All such protests were eventually discarded in the Romanian courts.  On one 
hand, these irregularities raise some questions of the exact extent to which the strategies of 
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coalition building and issue framing by the PSD were instrumental in passing the referendum.  
However, the estimated 57.7% voter turnout exceeded the minimum of 50% by a significant 
amount, which indicates that the government’s large-scale efforts to pass the referendum did 
have a strong effect on its approval, despite a small percent that may have been attributable to 
questionable practices.  Nevertheless, in my analysis, I will take some account of the role that the 
reportedly questionable tactics by the Romanian government might have had in passing the 
referendum. 
Using the Pridham/Ruzza matrix, which I set forth earlier as a framework for analyzing 
domestic actors and coalitions, I will make the case that Romania’s reform depended entirely on 
party elites from the PSD, coalition building, issue framing in line with Romania’s strongly pro-
EU popular opinion, and an institutional structure that was fundamentally amenable to change. 
 
 
Matrix A: Political Forces & Romania’s 2003 Constitution 
 Motivations Governance Political Arena 
Socio-Economic 
Arena 
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Political 
Opportunities 
(POS) (Or, how 
institutions 
empower or 
restrict success) 
-Since 1989, political 
incentive structure 
increasingly 
emphasizing 
Europeaniztaion 
-Incompatibility of old 
constitution with 
institutional standards 
for EU sovereignty in 
some areas meant 
Romania had to revise 
for EU 
-Unicameral 
parliamentary body 
split among parties, so 
parties need alliances 
-Constitutional 
revision possible by 
2/3 approval from both 
chambers of 
parliament and a 
popular referendum 
-Referendum must be 
held within 30 days of 
passing constitutional 
draft, placing a finite 
limit on public debate 
-Public opinion strongly 
in favor of accession to 
EU; reward to politicians 
for proceeding with EU 
-Shift: When PDSR was 
elected in 2000, it 
furthered EU talks; 
PDSR stance had 
changed toward EU 
-Shift: PDSR included 
Hungarian UDMR, PD, 
and PNL as elite 
coalition supporting 
drafting of constitution 
-PRM as only opposing 
major party 
-Small parties and 
NGOs outside of 
main political arena, 
left out of drafting 
-Role of socio-
economic actors in 
debate limited by 
30-day rule between 
parliamentary 
approval and voters’ 
referendum 
-NGOs and minority 
groups left to play a 
reactionary role in 
criticizing 
constitution only 
after drafting 
Framing (Or, 
how coalitions 
shape messages 
to gain 
approval) 
-PDSR motivation to 
continue EU progress 
to show relevance to 
voters and gain EU 
membership benefits 
-PD and PNL 
(democratic parties) 
value Western norms 
and Europeanization; 
demanded 
constitutional revision  
-Hungarian UDMR 
party concerned with 
minority rights and 
democracy 
-Nationalist PRM 
favored centralization, 
recognition of 
Romania’s unique 
culture apart from 
Western Europe 
-Need to form 
coalition, but enough 
democratic parties that 
nationalists could be 
left out  
-Romania’s already 
fulfilling many EU 
standards of 
democracy meant 
constitutional changes 
needed were not 
drastic, more 
procedural, and easier 
to agree on  
-Coalition formed with 
‘master frame’ focused 
on changes for EU 
membership 
-Constitutional draft 
limited to issues of 
specific changes for 
international institution 
compatibility; resisted 
chance to push for more 
-Absence of nationalist 
PRM from drafting 
process allowed 
democrats to frame issue 
openly around EU 
membership 
 -‘Master frame’ to 
public focused on EU 
accession, not 
constitution itself, 
because of public 
support for EU 
-However, some voting 
irregularities that 
included material 
rewards, threats, and 
misunderstanding of 
issues 
- NGOs and interest 
group actors were 
minimal in debate 
over referendum 
-NGOs played 
mostly reactionary 
role to drafts and in 
complaining about 
election 
irregularities 
-Orthodox Church 
spoke in support of 
referendum, 
changing earlier 
position of Euro-
skepticism  
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 Several important points emerge from this matrix regarding a ‘POS’ analysis, which 
accounts for political opportunities, institutional and otherwise, for enacting systemic change.  In 
the case of Romania, momentum toward EU membership had been building, particularly in the 
years between Iliescu’s first presidency ended in 1996 and his reelection in 2000.  In the early 
1990s, the costs of fully embracing the changes needed to accede to EU membership had seemed 
extremely high to Iliescu’s his party in Romania’s early post-communist days (especially given 
that members of his party, including Iliescu himself, were former communists).  By 2000, the 
PDSR was able to embrace this pro-European change as something that seemed inevitable, 
brought him political support from other liberal parties, and was popularly supported in 
remarkably high opinion polls. 
 In addition, the political system necessitated that the most legitimate and feasible source 
of change would come from within the parliament.  Thus, support for EU-friendly constitutional 
reform, necessary for accession, had to come from the major party elites within the parliamentary 
system.  In this case, the role of NGOs proved to be largely reactionary, as they were able to 
criticize the document after its drafting and criticize referendum results, but not to participate 
very actively or openly in the drafting process.  Conversely, however, one could make the case 
for the importance of public support in driving Romania’s overall trajectory that led to 
constitutional reform, as without this support the PDSR surely would have been less likely to 
build a coalition around the issue of constitutional change necessary for EU accession. 
 One further constraint in the perspective of POS came from the 30-day limit imposed by 
Romania’s previous constitution on the time that could take place between parliament’s passing 
of the draft and the voters’ referendum.  Many NGOs decried a lack of sufficient debate in the 
public sphere over the constitutional draft.  With a longer timeframe between the draft’s creation 
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and the voters’ referendum, actors in the socio-economic sphere might have had more time to 
facilitate discussion over the constitutional referendum beyond the government’s unabashedly 
pro-referendum campaigning. 
 In ‘framing’ terms, looking at how parties communicated the issue at hand offers several 
additional empirical findings.  Firstly, in forming the coalition to push for constitutional change 
in parliament, not only the PDSR but also the PD and PNL took the 2000 elections as an 
opportunity to prioritize constitutional reforms solely for the purpose of EU readiness.  In fact, 
the ability of the PDSR to form a more general coalition in parliament depended on its support of 
these constitutional changes, according to the PD and PNL.  Additionally, this coalition was able 
to leave out the nationalist PRM without compromising its Europeanizing goals because of the 
amount of support that a coalition of these parties and the Hungarian UDMR held in parliament.  
Therefore, the reform was pushed through parliament with a broad consensus that it would serve 
to bring Romania closer with EU procedural and institutional requirements as well as EU ideals 
for democracy. 
 The parliament’s framing efforts to the general public were a bit more complicated.  
Undoubtedly, the “Yes to Europe” slogan illustrates how the government wanted to play upon 
the public’s broad-level support for Romania’s EU accession.  Furthermore, the incorporation of 
the Hungarian minority, whose UDMR party held 7.8% of seats in the Chamber of Deputies after 
the 2000 elections, into the voting coalition sought to extend this message as widely as possible.  
However, the suggestion by the Romanian Institute for Public Policies that only 5% of voters had 
a sufficient understanding of the referendum echoed a sentiment widely seen in media reports 
that many voters viewed the referendum as an opinion poll for the PSD government instead of a 
vote on a new, EU-friendly constitution.  Nevertheless, for the government, this referendum went 
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in its favor, undoubtedly due to a combination of pro-EU issue framing as well as a generally 
positive and opinion of the new governing coalition at the time. 
 Even after the successful referendum, the question remained as to its legitimacy in the 
light of alleged voting irregularities.  Although these irregularities complicate any analysis of the 
effectiveness of the government’s campaign for the referendum, as I have already pointed out, 
the turnout was over 7% higher than the minimum, thus suggesting that elements I have 
highlighted aside from these problems did have a significant effect on the referendum’s success.  
A further question remains, however, regarding the democratic legitimacy of a document passed 
with such scandal overhead.  Indeed, one interpretation alleges that, largely because of this 
referendum scandal, Romania (like many other CEE countries in their post-communism 
transitions) remains a “semi-democracy”—on its way to legitimacy but not quite there yet.
106
 
Although this is a plausible interpretation, the fact is that Romania’s constitution made 
significant improvements over its prior version and was passed with widespread support coming 
from the country’s main political parties.  The EU’s instant approval of this document was 
solidified as it continued to place Romania on the path to EU membership, which the country 
eventually gained at the start of the year 2007.  Thus, the process of creating constitutional 
change in Romania actually stemmed from a pro-EU movement that had slowly picked up 
momentum both in domestic public opinion and, significantly, in support from elite political 
leaders.  Its success was primarily due to the framing these leaders offered of the referendum as a 
giant leap towards the EU, although the impact of an unknown number of individuals voting for 
the referendum despite not being fully informed of its significance cannot be discounted.  Finally, 
Romania’s institutional openness to fundamental change was instrumental in facilitating the 
coalition’s successful constitutional revision. 
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IV. Case Study Two: Serbia 
 
Historical Background 
The end of Slobodan Milošević’s presidency of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in 
2000 opened the way for the beginning of Serbia-EU relations and a transition to democracy.  As 
the president of Serbia and later of the FRY, Milošević had presided through conflicts in Bosnia-
Herzegovinia, Croatia, and Kosovo, the turbulent existence of the FRY.  Under Milošević’s 
regime, Serbia remained a socialist country longer than CEE peers, like Romania, which had 
largely begun to transition toward democracy immediately after the fall of communism.  
However, in Serbia’s complicated recent history, the underpinnings of democracy had actually 
begun with Milošević, who permitted the provisional formation of opposition parties and passed 
the country’s first post-communist constitution in 1990.  For this reason, it is important to gain 
insight into the Milošević regime and the recent history of Serbia before examining its 2006 
constitutional overhaul at the hands of a broad coalition of political parties. 
At best, Milošević, an ex-communist, was a political opportunist.  Milošević’s rise to 
power in 1989, after convincing his ally in the communist party to step down as president, 
illustrated this opportunism: “an ideological eclectic and political opportunist, he had no 
difficulty changing his political stripes from communism to nationalism and adapting his 
political style to fit the image of a national leader.”
107
  At worst, as portrayed in much of Western 
literature, he was a genocidal war criminal who used a sharp nationalism to unite ethnic Serbs 
through politics of fear.  During Milošević’s indictment by the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTFY), the prosecution argued that he had conspired for the ethnic 
cleansing and expulsion of non-Serbs “as part of a systematic plan to create an ethnically pure 
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Greater Serbia.”
108
  However, after years of conflict and the death, deportation, or imprisonment 
of hundreds of thousands of people,
109
 this Greater Serbia never emerged and the idea was 
eventually abandoned by Milošević.
110
  Under Milošević, Serbians endured years of economic 
hardship, marked by hyperinflation, United Nations (UN) sanctions and criminalized economic 
activity, and extreme poverty.  Furthermore, wars in surrounding countries, increased military 
spending, absorption of Balkan refugees, and eventual conflict with NATO over Kosovo all had 
serious effects on the country.  A general state of deterioration and lawlessness was experienced 
by most under this Milošević regime.
111
 
It was in 1990, during the early years of Milošević’s Serbian presidency, that the country 
adopted its first post-communist constitution.  The Constitution of Serbia was passed in 1990 by 
a parliament controlled by Milošević’s party, the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), which had 
combined the ruling Communist Party of Serbia with ethnic supporters of Milošević to form a 
single coalition.
112
  This constitution officially proclaimed Serbia as a democratic republic that 
featured a strong executive (Milošević). 
One extreme view of the 1990 constitution argues that, despite the democratic republic it 
purported to establish, the constitution was actually “a normative expression of authoritarian-
nationalist populism, based on non-democracy,”  where “Serbia is reduced to a sad state wherein 
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the ‘entire Republic resembles a single man [Milošević].’”
113
  Conversely, some argue that 
Milošević’s pattern of electoral behavior in elections after 1990 gave some democratic 
legitimacy to the constitution.  Milošević was forced throughout his presidency of Serbia and his 
later presidency of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) to form electoral coalitions in 
order to maintain the electability of his party; further, he eventually accepted his own electoral 
defeat in the 2000 elections at the hands of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) that had 
formed to overtake him for the federal presidency.
114
   
Reality lends some credence to both of these views in terms of the 1990 constitution, 
which was at once semi-democratic and disguisedly authoritarian.  Milošević nominally 
permitted the formation of a multiparty system with free elections.  However, his populist 
rhetoric of nationalism granted him security as the most viable presidential candidate for the 
foreseeable future.
 115
  Thus, in the constitution, he enshrined the Serbian presidency with 
“dictatorial powers, insofar as the President himself can declare a state of emergency, dissolve all 
judicial powers and abolish human rights.”
 116
  Additionally, this constitution “institutionally 
provided for an independent, sovereign state [of Serbia] without any further organizational 
relationship with the Yugoslav federation,”
117
 which would eventually dissolve by 2003. 
Milošević’s defeat came in 2000 during his campaign for reelection as president of the 
FRY.  After the destruction that occurred on Serbian soil during the NATO conflict over Kosovo, 
Milošević was unable to defeat Vojislav Koštunica of the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) in a 
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direct election.  Meanwhile, the DOS, which was made up of politicians from two large parties – 
the DSS and the Democratic Party (DS) – and a multitude of smaller parties, defeated the SPS of 
Milošević in Serbian elections.  Not long after, Milošević was extradited for trial by the ICTFY 
in The Hague, where he faced charges of war crimes and genocide.
118
 
The extradition of Milošević to The Hague exasperated existing strains in the DOS 
alliance.  The DSS’s Koštunica, a fierce nationalist even when compared with Milošević, 
opposed the extradition of the former president.  Meanwhile, the DS’s Zoran Djindjic, the prime 
minister of Serbia, was a pro-West academic who endorsed normalizing relations with the 
international community.  This ideological disagreement caused a rift in the coalition, and 
Koštunica announced the DSS’s separation from the DOS in 2002.
119
  The failure of this short-
lived coalition to agree on reforms stifled chances at constitutional revision in the first years after 
the fall of Milošević. 
Meanwhile, Serbia’s relationship with the EU had varied since 2000.  Prior to 
Milošević’s fall from power, Serbia had existed in international isolation as the EU’s policies 
toward Serbia focused primarily on “conflict containment.”
120
  By 2000, years of conflict in the 
Western Balkans left Serbia facing a “triple process” of “post-communist transition, post-war 
reconstruction and reconciliation, and EU integration.”
121
  After the 2000 democratic elections, 
the EU included Serbia in its Stabilization and Association Process, allowing for the negotiation 
of a Stabilization and Association Agreement.  Further, Serbia gained the status of “potential 
                                                 
118
 Tsukimura, 257-258. 
119
 Ibid., 258-259. 
120
 Cristina Dallara, “Serbia: Borderline democracy?” in International Actors, Democratization and the 
Rule of Law: Anchoring democracy?, eds. Amichai Magen and Leonard Morlino, (New York: Routledge, 
2009), 156. 
121
 Nathalie Tocci, The EU and Conflict Resolution: Promoting peace in the backyard, (New York: 
Routledge, 2007), 78. 
 Caitlin Wood | 57 
candidate” for membership.
122
  However, negotiations for a Stabilization and Association 
Agreement, which had begun in October 2005, were temporarily suspended in May 2006 due to 
Serbia’s failure to cooperate with the ICTFY regarding war crimes issues.
123
  Following the 
country’s 2006 constitutional revision and stated commitment to work with the ICTFY, EU talks 
resumed.  Although Serbia is not particularly advanced in its candidacy for EU accession, it 
remains a top recipient of EU development aid—more so than Turkey, Ukraine, or Romania.
124
 
 Nevertheless, ambivalence remains within Serbia regarding potential EU membership 
and whether a Western or Eastern-European (Russian) model of democracy should be followed.  
Despite this ambivalence about how to proceed with Serbia’s development, the course of events 
that took place in Serbia in 2006 necessitated a revisiting and revision of Milošević’s 
Constitution of 1990. 
 
“For the Good of Serbia”: An Overview and Analysis of the 2006 Constitutional Revisions 
On October 28-29, 2006, Serbian voters narrowly approved the country’s first replacement of the 
Constitution of 1990.  The referendum saw a 53.3% turnout, where some 51.4% of voters 
signaled approval for the new document.
125
  This constitution was passed by referendum less 
than a month after its unanimous approval by Serbia’s unicameral parliament (with 242 of 250 
Members of Parliament voting).
126
  Pro-Western Serbian politicians hailed the constitution as a 
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deliberate move in the direction of democratization and Europeanization.  A closer examination 
of the events that brought about constitutional change in 2006, however, shows that this 
constitution, in fact, came about as the result of significant compromise on the parts of Serbian 
policymakers with varying ideologies.  The ability of elites of diverse and conflicting ideologies 
to compromise was actually due to specific catalyzing events—the 2006 independence of 
Montenegro and rising concerns over the UN-run Kosovo and over Serbia’s territorial 
integrity—rather than the emergence of a consensus regarding democratization or 
Europeanization.  Using the matrix combining Pridham’s political systems theory and Ruzza’s 
perspectives of POS ‘political opportunities’ and ‘framing’, I will argue here that, in the case of 
Serbia, the adoption of a constitution that might appear to be pro-EU and pro-democratization 
was actually the result of a perceived institutional necessity brought on by specific events.  Thus, 
the document, worded toward democratization, actually came into being through issue framing 
that sought to reach across ideological lines, even including anti-Europe coalitions, under the 
theme of national necessity—“for the good of Serbia,”
127
 as the referendum slogan proclaimed. 
 In this case, unlike Romania’s, I will provide an overview of the Serbian parliamentary 
and presidential elections before examining the constitutional changes that these elected officials 
set into motion.  Serbia’s revised Constitution of 2006 included provisions for civil liberties, 
minority rights, human rights, and economic freedoms.  However, the constitution also featured a 
prominent and controversial claim to Kosovo as an autonomous, yet integral, part of Serbia.  The 
constitution has also been criticized as ambiguous in its democratizing, yet at times contradictory, 
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content.
128
  Largely, such idiosyncrasies, criticisms, and contradictions in the constitution arose 
because of the compromising and combining of the various of ideologies in power.   
 
Table 6: Serbian National Assembly Election Results, 2003129 
 
Party: G17 
Plus 
Serbian 
Radical 
Party 
(SRS) 
Democrat-
ic Party of 
Serbia 
(DSS) 
Democrat-
ic Party 
(DS) 
Serbian 
Renewal 
Movement-
New 
Serbia 
Socialist 
Party of 
Serbia 
2003 Vote Share 11.7% 27.7% 18.0% 12.6% 7.8% 7.4% 
2003 No. of Seats 34 82 53 37 23 21 
2003 Seat Share 13.6% 32.8% 21.2% 14.8% 9.2% 8.4% 
 
 
Table 7: Serbian Presidential Election Results, 2004130 131 
 
 B. Karic1 D. Marsicanin T. Nikolic B. Tadic 
Party:  Democratic 
Party of Serbia 
(DSS) 
Serbian Radical 
Party (SRS) 
Democratic 
Party (DS) 
2004—I 19.3% 13.3% 30.1% 27.3% 
2004—II n/a n/a 45.0% 53.7% 
1 Karic is successful businessman with close ties to the former Milosevic socialist regime.  He did not run under 
any of the major parties in this election. 
Several key patterns in the Serbian political landscape stand out in Tables 6 and 7 above.  Firstly, 
as no single party held a majority of parliamentary seats, creating constitutional change from 
within the legitimate parliamentary setting through a two-thirds vote automatically required 
parties to band together and form coalitions.  Secondly, while minority votes in a referendum 
presented a legitimate source of support or opposition for a constitution that had already passed 
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through parliament, minority parties did not form a significant part of the parliamentary 
negotiating process.  Finally, and most importantly, the ideological clashes between popular 
nationalist-radical parties and liberal pro-European parties heavily shaped the Serbian process of 
constitutional revision. 
In the years since Milošević, Serbia has been split between nationalist-radical and liberal, 
pro-European parties with conflicting views on how to develop the country’s young democracy.  
After the Democratic DOS, which had defeated Milošević, officially disbanded in 2002, the 
ultra-nationalist Serbian Radical Party (SRS) won more seats in parliament than any other party 
(though it still fell short of an absolute parliamentary majority).  Further, Tomislav Nikolic, the 
SRS presidential candidate in 2004, came very close to defeating the liberal DS’s Boris Tadić for 
the presidency.  Some argue that the relative success of the SRS represented a resurgence of the 
nationalist philosophy prevalent under Milošević.
132
  Others have pointed out that, since the 
parties which supported Milošević in 2000 won less votes in 2003 than in 2000, the success of 
the SRS was not actually a resurgence of nationalism, but rather a manifestation of 
dissatisfaction with the governing DOS coalition and the state of the Serbian economy.
133
  Either 
way, the popularity of nationalist-radicals, and of the SRS in particular, was concerning for 
proponents of Europeanization and Western democracy.  Serbia’s Radicals, while generally 
favoring democratization, desire a “more paternalistic approach to democracy” that maintains 
historical and emotional ties to Russian democratic development and, consequently, skepticism 
or opposition to joining the EU and meeting Western-European norms.
134
  For the Serbian 
nationalist-radicals, perception of the EU is largely tied to its demands of Serbian cooperation 
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with the ICTFY.  Nationalism “chimed in well with Serbian core beliefs since political culture 
remained locked in blame and denial [where] most Serbs saw themselves as…victims of a range 
of local and international forces…”
135
  Thus, in parliament the Serbian Radicals regularly “act as 
veto players inhibiting the adoption and implementation of EU-driven reforms.”
136
  On the local 
level, issues of ethnic conflict marked the geography of Serbia especially, in the regions of 
Kosovo and Vojvodina.
137
  The nationalist-radicals have favored solutions of centralization and 
national power over autonomy in these regions, while liberals generally desire the reverse. 
The Radical majority in parliament was not the only large force opposed to instituting 
pro-democratic constitutional reforms solely for the purpose of Europeanization.  Although the 
nationalist DSS had aligned with the liberal DS to defeat Milošević in 2000, its philosophy 
actually promoted a strong nationalism that was not compatible with sustaining a coalition with 
the liberal DS party.
138
  Led by Vojislav Koštunica, the DSS supported an “unapologetic 
nationalism” that likewise appealed to Serbs who were skeptical of the West and of international 
intervention.
139
  Koštunica served as Prime Minister in parliament and proved to be both an 
advocate for constitutional change and a cautious skeptic of European integration. 
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Opposing the nationalists and radicals was a smaller set of liberal, pro-Western parties, 
including Tadić’s DS party and the G-17 party.
140
 In contrast to the nationalists, these liberal 
parties were “clearly in favor of a pro-western form of government, and in favor of European 
integration.”
141
  Although these parties comprised an important part of the parliament, they were 
relatively weaker than the nationalists.  Importantly, Tadić’s position as president gave a voice to 
the pro-West viewpoint even though negotiations in parliament would require compromises of 
some of the liberals’ ideals for a new democratic constitution. 
Since 2000, the two post-Milošević governments had placed constitutional reforms at the 
top of their priorities due to the need to ensure Serbia’s democratic development.  In fact, a 
general consensus existed among political actors that the constitution needed replacement.  
However, previous efforts at constitution drafting by committees repeatedly reached impasses as 
parties blamed each other for obstructing the process.
 142
  One major obstacle to constitutional 
reform was the issue of holding new elections—what Boonstra refers to as the ‘sequencing 
problem’.
143
  As a legitimate reconstituting of the government through a parliamentary draft and 
popular referendum would require holding new elections once the constitution had passed, and 
given the delicate state of balance among Serbia’s political parties, no democratic party in power 
seemed to want to risk its position by passing a constitution that could shorten its term in 
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office.
144
  Another problem seemed to be that, with so many conflicting ideologies about how to 
best go about democratizing Serbia, designing a constitution which could be agreed on by all 
became a difficult task.  However, in the first half of 2006, changing circumstances made a 
drafting new constitution not only desirable by all parties, but in effect necessary. 
On May 21, 2006, Montenegro declared its independence from Serbia through a 
referendum.  Within ten days, Prime Minister Koštunica’s ruling liberal DSS party had called for 
an immediate revision of the constitution.  The actual need for replacing the constitution existed 
on several levels.  Starting five years before, it had first been a promise of Koštunica’s, then as 
president, to revise this document as a flawed relic of the “Milošević-era.”  Second, a new 
constitution had been demanded by the EU for years in its Stabilization and Association Process 
talks.  More powerfully, the independence of Montenegro “brought the issue to the forefront” of 
political debate; it could no longer linger in the background.”
145
  Serbia needed to constitute 
itself as a “sovereign, independent state,”
146
 detached from Montenegro as the final mark of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s dissolution that began several years prior.  Finally, the reality 
that the ‘sequencing problem’ of elections had changed was fundamentally important in 
catalyzing quick action for constitutional revision.  As international pressure mounted for a 
solution by the end of the year in Kosovo’s movement for independence, the democratic parties 
in power (including the DSS) feared that internationally-imposed independence for Kosovo 
would add momentum to the already potent Radical movement.
147
  Therefore, the opportunity to 
hold elections earlier than scheduled by passing a constitution seemed to allow the democratic 
parties to avoid the potential public backlash that might occur should an internationally-imposed 
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solution declaring Kosovo’s independence work to shift support to the Radicals by the end of the 
year.  With all of these incentives combined, the time was opportune for Koštunica’s ruling DSS 
party to act in drafting a constitution and building a coalition to support it. 
The drafting of a constitution took four months in parliament, where a parliamentary 
committee focused on creating compromises among all of the major political parties, while 
largely excluding input from coalitions outside of the parliament.  The new constitution was 
based on two earlier drafts “providing formal and legal grounds” for the new draft; one of these 
drafts had come from the ruling DSS party in 2004 and the other from the DS party in 2005.  
Further, parliament’s drafting process drew heavily on “a number of provisions and solutions 
from the 1990 Constitution,” in addition to demands from the SRS party as the largest opposition 
party.
148
  The most salient feature of the constitution was and remains its preamble, which states:  
The province of Kosovo is an integral part of Serbia’s territory, enjoying substantial 
autonomy within the framework of the sovereign state of Serbia and, consequently, all 
the state institutions are constitutionally obliged to defend Serbian interests in Kosovo.
149
 
 
This controversial preamble, aimed at gaining vital Radical support as well as that of Milosevic’s 
former SPS party, represents one example of the compromises made among the core coalition of 
parties in parliament, namely the DSS, DS, SRS, and SPS.  These compromises are showcased in 
Table 8 (below). 
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Table 8: Serbia’s 2006 Constitutional Compromises 
ISSUE COMPROMISE 
Kosovo SRS Radicals and SPS Socialists based support for 
constitution on addressing Kosovo (and Serbia’s territorial 
integrity) in preamble; also, DS and DSS believed this could 
“strengthen Serbia’s legal position” in Kosovo negotiations
150
 
Vojvodina SRS Radicals opposed granting too much autonomy to 
Vojvodina region and were happy to see that the constitution 
overall favored centralization; Vojvodina’s autonomy was not 
mentioned like Kosovo’s in preamble. Meanwhile, liberal DS 
party was happy that Constitution provided for some financial 
autonomy for Vojvodina
151
 
European Values Section I claims the Republic of Serbia is “based on the rule of 
law and social justice, principles of civil democracy, human 
and minority rights and freedoms, and commitment to 
European principles and values.”
152
  Claim: these principles 
“implicitly acknowledge” a European orientation for Serbia,
153
 
which was especially desired by DS party 
European 
Integration 
Lacks an “integrative clause” that would allow it to accede to 
EU without having to amend again by giving EU sovereignty 
in necessary areas;
154
 Constitution is not a final gear-up for EU 
integration as liberals might like 
 
These main compromises were sufficient to ensure that the draft constitution passed the 
National Assembly on October 1, 2006, with a unanimous vote among the 242 members of 
parliament who voted (of 250 total).
155
  However, despite the involvement of main party 
members in negotiations, NGOs and smaller political parties expressed dismay at being left out 
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entirely from the constitutional debates.  In fact, the actual text of the constitutional draft was not 
available to the public before its approval, and the draft was put to a parliamentary vote without 
an open debate after weeks of informal negotiations, presumably due to the urgency of the draft’s 
passing.
156
  This lack of transparency and public debate attracted criticism from the Organisation 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe, prominent NGOs, and even President Tadić of the 
DS.
157
  The very nature of the parties’ effort to pass an acceptable constitution as rapidly as 
possible precluded in-depth public discourse, and policy shaping occurred only at the most elite 
levels of large political parties. 
The government-funded referendums were set for October 28-29, 2006, less than one 
month after parliament had passed the draft constitution.  The constitution continued to receive 
opposition from non-parliamentary parties as well as the opposition of the G-17 party,
158
 which 
was threatening to withdraw from government because of the refusal of the Serbian government 
to cooperate with the ICTFY.
159
  The speaker of Vojvodina’s parliament also called for a boycott 
of the referendum for lack of a public debate,
160
 as did numerous NGOs from Vojvodina.
161
  
Moreover, the referendum attracted controversy as the government had removed some one 
million ethnic Albanian voters from the registers for the last six years, since the pro-
independence majority in Kosovo had abstained from voting since 1990.  Thus, in an electorate 
of only 6.5 million Serbian voters, this large number was missing despite the referendum’s 
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notable reference to Kosovo.
162
  A variety of groups also spoke out in support of the referendum.  
Ethnic minority groups of Goranis
163
 and Bosniaks
164
 urged voters to support the constitution.  
The Greek Orthodox Church extended its support, as Kosovo was seen as a religious heartland 
for the Church.
165
  Taken together, these groups presented a diverse selection of political actors 
and actors from the socio-economic arena who appealed to targeted groups of voters based on 
specific issues of appeal (i.e., religious heritage for the Orthodox majority). 
The issue of historical voter apathy was at least as dangerous to the approval of the 
constitutional referendum as the opposition that had organized against it.
166
  The question 
remained to be answered as to how the government could broadly appeal to at least a simple 
majority of registered voters in order to have the public approve the referendum.  In parliament 
and in subsequent media reports about the draft constitution, the issue of territorial integrity in 
Kosovo had taken precedence over other elements of the constitution.  However, analysts and 
opinion polls indicated that a forceful message focusing only on Kosovo would not resonate with 
voters.  Opinion polls taken around 2005-2006 suggested shifting sensibilities among Serbian 
voters, who, despite longstanding attachment to the Kosovo territory, appeared to be less 
absolute in their beliefs about a potential Kosovo independence than the government was.  In one 
such poll, “61.9% of Serbs from Serbia said that they were open to Kosovar Albanians’ preferred 
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future status outcome, that is to say some form of independence.”
167
  In another opinion poll, 
only 10% of voters who supported the constitution said that they would do so for the purpose of 
claiming sovereignty over Kosovo.
168
  Thus, the legislators’ focus on Kosovo had been more 
political, reconciling strong differences among party ideologies, than pragmatic in reflecting 
constituents’ desires and working to truly answer the Kosovo question.  One analyst explained 
that, instead of a “forceful campaign…that would exaggerate things such as we are preserving 
Kosovo and so forth,” he believed “[p]eople should be told that this is a debt, an obligation that 
needed to be fulfilled four, five, or six years ago.”
169
  In fact, the government’s referendum 
campaign chose to embrace a softened message that appealed more to voters’ concerns over the 
country’s general economic and political well-being.  This campaign featured the slogan, “Good 
days for the good of Serbia.”
170
  Billboards displaying this motto implored voters to consider the 
referendum as a fundamental step for their country’s future, not as a political mandate to Kosovo. 
On the first day of the referendum, turnout reached a reported 17.5% at close, though this 
number was nearly double in Serb enclaves of Kosovo.
171
  This low percentage was overcome by 
the end of the second day, when overall turnout reached 53.3%, with 51.4% voting for the 
approval of the referendum.
172
  Regional turnout levels were disparate across areas of Serbia; in 
Vojvodina, only 43.6% of voters went to the polls, while in Kosovo (where this figure primarily 
reflects the ethnic Serb population that comprises around 10% of Kosovo), turnout was around 
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81.6%.
173
  Voters in Vojvodina expressed their disappointment over the amount of autonomy 
that the constitution had given them, while Serbs in Kosovo turned out in large numbers hoping 
to keep the region within Serbia.  The overall turnout was moderate; while those who voted 
overwhelmingly approved of the constitution, the referendum was less than a slim two points 
more than the margin needed to gain approval. 
Outside organizations, including the EU’s European Commission, praised the adoption of 
this constitution as a progressive step toward democratization and internationalization in Serbia.  
However, internal NGOs, such as the independent and established Centre for Free Election and 
Democracy (CeSID), have pointed to various electoral irregularities and potentially unethical 
intimidation and “massive state pressure” on Serbian citizens.  These tactics, allegedly used by 
government officials, largely went overlooked in the international eye.
174
  For the purpose of my 
analysis, it is useful to include possible voter coercion into a framing perspective in attaining a 
full explanation of why voters turned out. 
Thus, with this timeline of events in mind, it is possible to synthesize a theory of the main 
factors that created Serbia’s 2006 constitutional change.  Matrix B that follows presents a 
complete ‘framing’ analysis as well as a ‘POS’ analysis, using Pridham’s political systems 
theory as a base for investigating these perspectives. 
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Matrix B: Political Forces & Serbia’s 2006 Constitution 
 
Motivations Governance Political Arena 
Socio-Economic 
Arena 
Political 
Opportunities 
(POS) (Or, how 
institutions 
empower or 
restrict success) 
-Long-term desire of 
DSS to revise old 
constitution 
-EU encouraging 
constitutional change for 
years as part of 
Stabilization and 
Association Process 
-Shift: Montenegro’s 
independence leaves 
Serbian constitution in 
need of update 
-Shift: Obstacles that 
created Boonstra’s 
elections ‘sequencing 
problem’
175
 were 
removed, so that it was 
desirable for democratic 
parties to hold elections 
earlier 
-Unicameral 
parliamentary body 
split among parties 
forced alliances to form 
-2/3 majority vote 
required to change 
constitution from 
legislature, seen as only 
legitimate way to enact 
democratic change 
-A full majority of 
registered voters in 
Serbia had to approve 
referendum at polls 
-Removing estimated 1 
million Kosovars from 
voting rolls made it 
institutionally easier to 
pass referendum 
-Alignment of party 
elites initially 
restricted change; 
democratic coalition 
deterred by chance of 
losing power in early 
elections and 
Radicals in favor of 
vastly different 
provisions 
-Shift: Of events 
made democratic 
parties want to hold 
earlier elections, 
more willing to 
compromise with 
Radicals 
-Minority parties 
and groups outside 
of main political 
arena, including 
NGOs, left out of 
drafting 
-Such groups played 
a reactionary role in 
criticizing or 
supporting 
constitution; not 
much effect on 
document itself or 
its outcome 
-Leaving these 
groups out enabled 
faster change but 
meant less public 
discourse 
Framing (Or, 
how coalitions 
shape messages 
to gain 
approval) 
-DS party wanting to 
Europeanize, create 
distance from Milošević 
regime 
-DSS party wanting to 
modernize and maintain 
stronghold as democratic 
coalition leader 
-Nationalist SRS party 
wanting to centralize and 
limit autonomy for 
Kosovo, other regions 
-Shift: After 
Montenegro’s 
independence, parties 
agreed on revising to 
assert Serbia’s 
sovereignty and try and 
gain legal ground on the 
-Need to form coalition 
in parliament among 
democratic parties and 
Radicals was realized 
through shift in events, 
motivations 
-However, voting 
population less extreme 
on issue of Kosovo, so 
a need arose to frame 
issue differently to 
public 
-Among political 
groups, a ‘master 
frame’ emerged of 
revision as necessary 
to preserve territorial 
integrity, ensure 
sovereignty, 
modernize 
-Media focused 
heavily on Kosovo 
aspect of constitution 
-Leading political 
coalition changed 
tone of ‘master 
frame’ for public; 
focused less on 
Kosovo/more on 
modernization 
-Public framing of 
issue allegedly 
-Some groups, 
including some 
minority groups, 
urged voters to 
support because of 
particular issues 
(like minority rights) 
-Other groups 
including local 
governments 
(Vojvodina) and 
NGOs opposed, 
based on inadequate 
public discourse, but 
these groups did not 
stop referendum 
from passing 
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issue of Kosovo included threats of 
lawlessness if the 
constitution was not 
passed 
 
From this matrix, several key points emerge from the POS analysis, which focuses on 
opportunities in the political system.  First, the Serbian domestic institutions permitted revision 
by democratic means—that is, by a legislative proposal approved by a two-thirds majority and a 
popular referendum.  However, the fragmented nature of political parties had led to a 
considerable impasse in revising the constitution.  This phenomenon had been worsened by the 
elections ‘sequencing problem’, which meant that the DSS, as the leader of the majority 
democratic coalition, had little incentive to revise the constitution for fear of being defeated by 
the Radicals before its electoral term was up.  In 2006, Montenegro’s declared independence and 
the growing focus on Kosovo’s separatist movement actually made it more desirable to hold 
elections earlier, thus eliminating this disincentive for the leading coalition.  This shift in salient 
political issues also provided grounds for compromise among the democratic and Radical parties 
over Kosovo’s sovereignty.  This empirical study has shown that this fundamental shift in 
Serbia’s system allowed for political party elites to draft the document, with little to no input 
from smaller civil society groups and minority interests.  However, questions remain as to how 
democratically legitimate a constitution created without much input from sectors outside of the 
government, particularly minorities, may be. 
The framing perspective complements the POS analysis by considering the means of 
communication by which party coalitions and the electorate mobilized to ultimately approve the 
constitution.  Like POS, the framing analysis looks to the events of 2006 as critical for shifting 
parties’ motivations to redraft the constitution and for improving their willingness to compromise.  
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Political parties in parliament actually framed the document according to the stances most 
fundamental to their separate ideologies.  For the pro-Western DS party, the constitutional draft 
was a chance to open lines of communication with greater Europe.  For the Radicals, the 
constitution and the emerging problem of Kosovo’s independence created an opportunity to push 
for nationalistic centralization in government.  Overall, these parties found middle ground in 
seeking a basic level of democratization through the constitution.  However, the document’s 
general framing, at times ambiguous, means that the way in which this democracy will develop 
depends largely on the direction that the parliament takes in passing future laws.
176
 
Although the media tended to emphasize the Kosovo issue, the government successfully 
crafted a ‘master frame’ campaign to appeal to the wider public—but primarily the ethnic Serb 
majority.  This ‘master frame’ was somewhat different from the way that political parties had 
framed the document in parliament according to their interests and the Kosovo issue.  The 
government utilized a campaign for the public that stressed the general importance of the 
document to Serbia’s future development.  In doing so, it reportedly used questionable 
techniques, such as the threat of anarchy in the event that the referendum were to fail.
177
  
Nevertheless, the creation of a ‘mater frame’ was responsive to the general political climate in 
Serbia that was distrustful of the government and highly valued improvement in living 
conditions even more than claiming Kosovo as a Serbian territory.  Ultimately, the government’s 
ability to frame the constitution as necessary for Serbia, after the document’s origins in 
parliament as a set of ideological compromises, was crucial in the successful constitutional 
referendum. 
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In Serbia, the question of EU relations remains unanswered.  On one hand, passing this 
constitution was a necessary step in continuing talks with the EU for a possible Serbian 
accession in the future.  On the other hand, the question of EU ‘accession fatigue’ after the recent 
addition of a second wave of CEE countries makes it uncertain whether the EU will ever be 
ready to receive Serbia.
178
  Certainly, Serbia will require future constitutional amendment if it is 
to accede to the EU.  If such revisions occur, Serbia’s political will in terms of parties and public 
opinion must be more prepared to support the document not out of a sense of duty stemming 
from its anachronism, but rather out of a desire to accede to EU membership status.  However, 
the precarious balance of ideologies in Serbia makes the country’s own desire to join the EU in 
the future an even larger question.   
Therefore, Serbia’s Constitution of 2006 demonstrates an interesting compromise in a 
country that, like many former communist countries, faces internal pressures from a wide and 
evolving set of popular ideologies.  Although this constitution represented a needed update from 
Milošević’s democratic framework put forward in 1990, ultimately the fate of democratic 
development in Serbia and Serbia’s European future will depend on whether its affectations fall 
on the side of its pro-Western or its Radical elements in the years to come. 
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V. Comparative Analysis of Cases 
 
What do the cases of Romania and Serbia’s constitutional reforms collectively tell us about the 
roles of domestic actors in creating change?  From the individualized matrixes for each of these 
cases, some broad conclusions can be drawn about the process of constitutional change in these 
countries, in other CEE countries, and in potential EU candidates more generally.  On one hand, 
the cases reached a similar outcome: both constitutions passed and were applauded by the EU for 
advancements toward European standards of democracy.  On the other hand, the outcomes 
differed on a fundamental level: Romania’s constitution brought the country in line with EU 
standards for membership, while Serbia’s constitution left it in need of further reforms in order to 
meet EU standards.  These cases show a strong role for ‘bottom-up’ actors in creating 
constitutional change.  Both cases illustrate the important role of domestic actors in initiating 
such changes and the way that variances in ‘bottom-up’ conditions and actions might produce 
different outcomes.  The essential differences and similarities in case analyses of domestic 
actors’ ‘political opportunities’ (POS) and ‘framing’ approaches that led to these outcomes are 
summarized in Matrix C, below. 
Matrix C: Comparing Coalitions and Constitutional Outcomes in Romania (2003) 
and Serbia (2006) 
 
 Romania Serbia BOTH 
Political Coalitions 
& Framing 
Formed a Coalition of 
Similarities among liberal 
parties and Hungarians – 
interested in changing just 
for EU; Able to leave 
Radical party out 
Formed a Coalition of 
Compromise among 
spectrum of parties 
(liberals, radicals, 
moderates) based on need 
to modernize and preserve 
territorial integrity, after 
specific events 
Change led by elite 
coalitions; NGOs and other 
organizations largely left 
out of drafting process and 
were relegated to 
reactionary roles 
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Coalitions’ Framing 
to Public 
Framed issue to match 
public support for EU; Also 
included Hungarian 
minority and public support 
for Iliescu’s government 
Framed to public as 
overdue step toward 
modernization (instead of 
as mandate to Kosovo); 
Largely ignored issue of 
EU in public framing 
Framed issue to the 
public’s mindset 
POS & Political 
Systems 
Coalition of left-leaning 
parties ready to act 
following the defeat of the 
impotent centrist CDR party 
Parties needing to 
compromise because of 
ideological differences to 
form necessary bloc in 
parliament to pass 
reforms 
Democratic systems were 
open to legitimate change 
through parliament, then 
popular referendum; 
Multiparty system required 
coalitions to form 
majorities big enough to 
pass changes 
POS & Incentives 
for Main Parties 
Main PDSR party 
encouraged to embrace 
constitutional reform 
because of country’s 
progress toward EU, 
popular support for EU, and 
need to gain support for 
other issues in parliament 
Independence of 
Montenegro and 
instability over Kosovo 
reversed the disincentive 
for main DSS party, 
which had previously 
dragged feet on 
constitutional change 
because elections would 
risk power       
Key differences are 
highlighted here—Romania 
reformed with parties fully 
embracing EU and 
democratization; Serbia 
reformed with much 
compromise only after 
main party could be 
convinced it did not stand 
to lose from constitutional 
reform 
Outcomes Constitution readily passed 
and brought Romania within 
sufficient EU standards for 
2007 membership 
Constitution narrowly 
passed and brought Serbia 
steps closer to EU 
standards, but future 
changes would  be 
required to gain EU 
membership 
Referendums passed and 
met with general praise 
from the EU 
 
The matrix above combines the individual country matrixes for Romania and Serbia to highlight 
only the most crucial differences and similarities in coalitions’ POS and framing.  Although it 
does not present an all-exclusive list of similarities and differences in the coalition-forming and 
issue framing that occurred, it aims to highlight those similarities and differences that had the 
greatest impact on the outcomes of these cases. 
 Beginning with a framing perspective, it is clear that both Romania and Serbia were led 
to constitutional reform by coalitions formed by political elites.  This corresponds with 
Schumpeter’s theory of elites, which posits that the most crucial decisions are actually made by a 
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select number of powerful individuals.
179
  This finding overlaps with a POS analysis, which 
explains the need for elites by looking at the countries’ pre-reform constitutional systems.  Both 
countries’ existing constitutions necessitated legitimate constitutional change from within the 
legislatures, which reflected the existing multiparty political systems.  This meant that political 
parties— controlling well under the 2/3 majority needed to pass constitutional changes—were 
required to form coalitions with other major parties.  Together, these institutional aspects and the 
issue framing that occurred demonstrate that these countries’ constitutional changes could not 
have taken place without the backing of political elites from major parties. 
 However, a framing analysis also reveals a significant difference in the ways that political 
party coalitions were able to agree on the issue of constitutional change.  In Romania, where 
public support for EU integration was very high and the country was advanced in its negotiations 
with the EU, party officials from the PDSR (previously uncertain about proceeding with EU 
negotiations) readily took the opportunity to build a broad base of support around the issue of 
constitutional change for the purpose of EU accession.  This opportunity offered the PDSR, as 
the incoming largest party in parliament, the chance to form a lasting coalition with other liberal 
parties that wanted to see Romania join the EU.  In fact, party support for Romania’s coalition 
was so strong that the PDSR/PSD was able to avoid negotiating with the nationalist PRM despite 
its 24% seat share in parliament.  This point contrasts greatly with Serbia, where constitutional 
change occurred only as a compromise among nearly all major parties including the anti-EU 
Radicals.  Serbia’s need to compromise was undoubtedly a function of its relatively less 
advanced stage in EU talks as well as its public’s relative ambivalence toward EU membership.  
Ultimately, the coalition that formed was able to agree on constitutional change not for purposes 
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of Europeanizing or joining the EU, but rather for purposes of modernization and maintaining 
territorial integrity. 
Both the Romanian and Serbian governments utilized a ‘master frame’ in which they 
considered how to optimize voter enthusiasm.  This too played a role in their ability to pass 
constitutional reforms.  In Romania, the same message that had brought the governing coalition 
together, that is, change for the EU, was very appealing to the public’s strongly pro-EU 
sentiment.  In Serbia, the parliament generally tried to emphasize the modernization aspect of the 
constitution more than the issues of territorial integrity and Kosovo that had secured the 
Radicals’ participation in the revision process.  Only in Kosovo itself did the message of keeping 
Kosovo serve as a strong driver for ethnic Serbs to come to the polls.  In the rest of the country, 
the focus on modernization after Milošević’s regime held more clout with voters. 
The POS perspective presents some additional insights into the factors that influenced the 
outcomes of these cases.  As I have mentioned, the case of Romania was largely one of consent 
over Europeanization, while Serbia’s case was representative of a compromise among major 
parties which was spurred by the issues of Montenegro and Kosovo.  In fact, once Romania’s 
PDSR won the 2000 elections, forming a coalition around the issue of pro-EU constitutional 
change became an easy and expected next step for the country, already so advanced in and 
enthusiastic about its EU negotiations.  By contrast, Serbia’s constitutional reform, although 
much needed, had long been hampered by the country’s division among parties and Boonstra’s 
‘sequencing problem’.
180
  Thus, whereas electing a new party gave Romania the opportunity 
needed to implement EU-minded constitutional reform, it took a deeper change combating this 
‘sequencing problem’ to allow Serbia’s DSS to act.  This change came at the hands of 
Montenegro’s declared independence earlier in the year and the increased prospects of Kosovo’s 
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possible independence in the near future.  Ultimately, in both countries, it was the relative 
openness of the democratic process that allowed legislatures to form coalitions and pass 
constitutional drafts with relative ease.  In Serbia’s case, the opening of this system by the 
removal of the ‘sequencing problem’ further illustrates the impact that institutions’ amenability 
to change has on the constitution drafting process. 
In the end, it is not hard to see how Romania’s constitutional reforms led to its prompt 
EU accession, while Serbia’s led only to further talks with the EU due to its many compromises.  
These cases demonstrate overall how countries take the EU into account when making policy 
decisions—for Romania, the entire change was spurred by the EU, while for Serbia, the EU was 
widely debated and its standards overtly acknowledged in the constitution at the urging of the 
most liberal parties.  Furthermore, this comparison shows CEE countries at different phases of 
EU talks and with differing levels of public support for EU membership.  In fact, if Serbia 
wishes to join the EU in the future, it will be forced to make bolder, more overtly pro-European 
changes (similar to those made by Romania) to its 2006 constitution.  For a country like Serbia, 
unsure of whether it will accede to EU membership in the future, this comparison shows the 
importance of compromise among parties and broad support among the public in advancing what 
had been strained talks with the EU.  Most broadly, this comparison illustrates the importance of 
political elites in the process of initiating constitutional change, the necessity of having 
sufficiently open democratic systems in order to receive this change, and the need to frame a 
message in a manner that resonates with voters.   
Finally, both cases raise significant concern over the absence of open, non-elite led 
debate involving NGOs and public forums for considering such large systemic changes.  
Complaints abounded in both Romania and Serbia from NGOs about the low levels of debate 
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that took place between drafts passing parliament and being put to vote.  It is not an 
understatement to add that NGOs and actors from outside of political parties played disturbingly 
small roles in the actual drafting processes.  Indeed, attaining a sufficient level of representation 
in the drafting and debating processes for all of the many ethnic and social groups represented 
within these countries would be difficult, but undoubtedly more democratic.  While allowing for 
elite-driven change is more efficient in taking action in situations constrained by time, 
constitutions—the most fundamental of governing documents—might best be crafted with the 
utmost deference to representing all of their countries’ constituent members. 
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VI. Conclusion 
 
This study has attempted to explain why domestic actors in countries like Romania and Serbia, at 
two very different stages of EU talks and with disparate amounts of public support for EU 
membership, have nonetheless been able to achieve constitutional change that have met with EU 
approval.  Through empirical case studies, the thesis has established that several components 
prove fundamental to constitutional change in countries with existing democratic systems that 
require popular referendums after legislative approval: the support of domestic political elites, 
institutions and systems that are generally open to systemic change, and a message that will 
resonate with the voting public. 
The differences observed between the cases of Romania and Serbia offer a more 
insightful answer to the question of why both countries were able to pass constitutional reforms 
despite their significant divergence in prospects for EU membership and in public support for EU 
membership.  Romania achieved constitutional reform on the momentum of EU fervor that had 
been building for years in the country.  It was able to do so because of the changing of the re-
ascent of the PDSR, whose enthusiastic embracing of EU membership was actually indicative of 
how advanced the country had become in its EU negotiations and in its public support for joining 
the EU.  Romania required no major institutional or systemic changes to pass the referendum, 
only a newly elected party to form a coalition and build upon the public’s support for EU 
membership.  By contrast, Serbia’s overall ambivalence toward EU membership and toward the 
future path its democracy would take was seen in the strong Radical presence in its legislature.  
Serbia actually required an institutional shock, delivered by the independence of Montenegro as 
well as growing knowledge of Kosovo’s potential declaration of its own independence, in order 
to reform its constitution at last.  This shock forced political elites to consider the necessity of 
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compromise for constitutional change.  Specifically, it compelled the DSS party to desire earlier 
elections when the party previously had feared them.  The country’s overall ambivalence toward 
EU membership and need to compromise were reflected in the contents of the constitution as 
well as in the way that the Serbian government framed its referendum as a step toward 
modernization, rather than toward the EU.  In brief, the major findings of this empirical study are 
found in Figure 4, below. 
Figure 4: Summary of Key Findings for Constitutional Change 
 
A Country with Good Prospects of Acceding to EU and High Popular Approval 
of EU Membership Requires: 
o Right timing with EU talks and elite coalition ready to embrace 
constitutional reforms 
o Issue framing that mobilizes voters to capitalize on their EU 
enthusiasm 
A Country with Questionable Prospects of Acceding to EU and Ambivalent 
Popular Sentiment toward EU Membership Requires: 
o Possible institutional or systemic shock, changing incentives or power 
structure among major players 
o Short-run compromise among major parties and political elites 
o Issue framing not around EU but instead around issues most 
important to voters 
In General, Countries Requiring Legislative Approval for Constitutional Drafts 
followed by Referendum Require: 
o Domestic political elites willing to support constitutional change 
o Issue framing that caters to voter sentiment 
o Sufficient institutional openness and receptiveness to systemic change 
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Limitations 
It is important to acknowledge the limitations of this thesis, along with some broader limitations 
of this type of study.  Most generally, the relatively recent nature of these events and ever-
changing relations among the EU and its candidate/potential candidate countries inherently limits 
the availability of academic literature on these topics.  Furthermore, although this analysis 
benefitted greatly from the wide availability of English-language foreign press articles, more 
primary sources would have contributed much to this paper’s examination of the ways that 
coalitions framed these issues. 
As with any case study, the question of how to extrapolate generalizations from the 
results is important here.  This paper asserts that the most fundamental finding of common 
threads between these two cases is, in fact, very applicable to the majority of cases of countries 
considering constitutional change from within an existing democratic framework.  However, a 
few limitations of these specific cases must be discussed briefly.  In both Romania and Serbia, 
NGOs and international groups protested against various techniques used by the government to 
encourage voter turnout.  They also critiqued the lack of open, public discussion of the 
constitutional drafts.  Furthermore, Serbia’s act of dropping 1 million Kosovars from its voting 
rolls several years before invites questioning of whether or not the government’s referendum 
may be viewed as wholly legitimate.  Likewise, the liberal Romanian coalition led by the 
PDSR/PSD purposely included the Hungarian minority in its drafting coalition but did not reach 
out to the long-oppressed Roma minority.  These concerns are extremely pertinent to issues of 
democratic legitimacy, human rights, and the general state of affairs in post-communist countries 
looking to democratize.  Despite such objections, this thesis maintains that valuable lessons exist 
within the cases for the ways in which governing coalitions have gone about, and will continue 
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to go about, enacting constitutional change.  The constraints of this study require that I pass little 
judgment on just how ‘democratic’ or ‘legitimate’ either change was and, rather, that I focus on 
the ability of such changes to work toward legitimate democracy in the long run as part of an 
ongoing and evolving process. 
A similar objection may be raised regarding the use of EU approval as a benchmark for 
democratic development.  The EU is neither completely objective, nor is it static, when it comes 
to the meaning and definition of its standards of democracy.  In addition, the EU operates with 
economic, political, and security considerations that come in conjunction with its democratic 
standards and which may, at times, supersede them.  Thus, just because the EU approves of a 
document as a whole does not guarantee that it meets objective and unquestionable democratic 
standards.  In fact, Romania’s inclusion with Bulgaria for accession had a great deal to do with 
EU security and political concerns in the CEE region rather than the minimal democratic 
progress made by Romania from 1996-2000 under the CDR.  Nevertheless, using EU democratic 
standards as a benchmark reflects the real influence that the EU has as an institution in policy 
changes in its potential member countries.  Furthermore, these standards set by the EU, although 
not perfect, present a measurable opposition to alternative Eastern modes of democracy, 
exemplified by contemporary Russia.  For CEE countries like Serbia, this dichotomy is very real 
and reflected in their current political climates.  For this reason, measuring how these countries 
perform in comparison to EU standards offers a simple and significant barometer for where 
countries stand in relation to the Western democratic community. 
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Implications for the EU and for Potential EU Member Countries 
On the intergovernmental level, this study has shown that the EU has a large role to play in 
guiding the policy movements and constitutional frameworks for its potential entrant states—
even those that, like Serbia, remain uncertain of whether they will be able to gain entrance.  The 
EU should, therefore, remain cognizant of the important role it plays in transitioning most CEE 
countries away from communist systems and toward consolidated democracy. 
This analysis also has strong implications for specific countries operating within the EU’s 
orbit, which continually interacts with national governments in ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ 
manners.  One such country in need of further reforms in order to solidify its EU accession is the 
Republic of Turkey.  Turkey has been in discussions with the EU for over forty years regarding 
its membership, yet has been unable to satisfy the EU’s criteria despite constitutional 
amendments in 2004 and 2007.  The population of Turkey has witnessed a drop in support for 
EU membership in the past several years.  In 2006, Turkey expressed the lowest support for 
continued expansion of the EU out of all EU members and candidate countries, with just 45% of 
the population in favor of expansion.  At that time, only 43% of Turks held a positive view of the 
EU.
181
  Turkey falls short of EU requirements for democracy in many ways, including its 
provisions for minority rights, freedom of speech, and democratic institutions.  With a system 
that has been unable to attain large-scale constitutional transition, Turkey’s success at satisfying 
EU standards might depend, similar to the case of Serbia, on a systemic shock that would allow 
for more profound change and more significant involvement of elite coalitions.  Although its 
institutions have allowed constitutional change in the past, they make larger changes—like 
allowing for government, not secular, control of the military—much more difficult, which 
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suggests a dim future for Turkey given this study’s observations of a need for institutional 
openness to change.  Finally, the importance of message framing must not be forgotten for Turks 
who are in favor of Europeanization.  Although the country has been able to pass constitutional 
changes in recent years, mostly aimed at EU compatibility, its waning public support for EU 
membership casts doubt on the continued ability of coalitions to form around the issue and voters 
to continue to support it unless the importance of such reforms becomes more clearly aligned 
with the country’s overall well-being in the future. 
 
Future Research 
Critically, this thesis aims to establish the importance of including the ‘bottom-up’ perspective of 
domestic actors in any analysis of EU impact on national policies.  Too often, discussions on the 
impact of the EU treat potential member countries as completely devoid of agency in the policy 
negotiating process, implying that the EU has far more sway than domestic actors in determining 
accession and its related policy decisions within countries.  This is correct in a way—every EU 
member country retains a final veto over accession decisions, and the EU is currently dealing 
with substantial ‘enlargement fatigue’.  Nonetheless, the ways in which EU norms become 
policies at the national level are primarily determined by national actors in a democratic process.  
Whether or not these countries eventually become EU members, their domestic policies will be 
considerably altered as a result of their interactions with the EU and its standards for democracy.  
Therefore, while the ‘top-down’ literature currently outnumbers ‘bottom-up’ perspectives by a 
great amount, it is worthwhile to pursue similar ‘bottom-up’ studies in the future. 
 Finally, a normative analysis was regrettably beyond the scope of this study.  However, 
such future research will be critical in not only examining how domestic actors shape 
 Caitlin Wood | 86 
constitutions and national policies based on EU standards, but also in evaluating what types of 
constitutional changes have the best net effects for democracy.  Ideally, such an evaluation 
would incorporate, as in the work of Magen and Morlino,
182
 the aspect of policy implementation 
(beyond nominal changes in laws and institutions).  Perhaps, after all, the EU is not promoting 
optimal brands of democratization in CEE countries.  On the contrary, it might be that without 
the EU incentive, these countries would fail to fully shake their societies’ ties to communism.  
Only through normative studies that actually evaluate the effects of national changes toward EU 
standards can we begin to reflect on what a tremendous impact the EU has had on national 
policies and, indeed, whether or not this impact has been fundamentally beneficial at the state 
level. 
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